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“Nationwide” Injunctions are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are 
Never Appropriate 
Howard M. Wasserman† 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent constitutional litigation has challenged the validity of laws, regulations, 
and policies from the Obama and Trump Administrations regulating immigration 
and immigration-adjacent matters. Plaintiffs have brought pre-enforcement lawsuits 
seeking to enjoin responsible federal officials from enforcing the challenged laws, 
regulations, and policies. Consider: 
• The Fifth Circuit enjoined enforcement of President Obama’s Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) 
program, a decision affirmed by an evenly divided eight-person Supreme Court.1 
• The Fourth and Ninth Circuits enjoined enforcement of President Trump’s 
third Executive Order limiting travel to the United States by nationals of certain 
majority-Muslim countries and heightening review procedures for admitting 
refugees from certain countries,2 which the Supreme Court agreed to review during 
the April sitting of October Term 2017.3 This followed decisions by both courts 
enjoining enforcement of prior orders on the same issues.4 
• District judges in the Northern District of California and in the Northern 
District of Illinois enjoined enforcement of Department of Justice regulations 
stripping “sanctuary cities” of federal funds from law-enforcement grant programs.5 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the latter decision.6 
• A district judge in the Western District of Washington enjoined enforcement 
of regulations requiring immigration attorneys to either appear and assume full 
representation or refrain from giving legal advice to pro se parties to immigration 
proceedings.7 
                                                 
† Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Samuel Bray, Amanda Frost, David Marcus, Joelle 
Moreno, James Pfander, and Adam Zimmerman and to my FIU colleagues for comments on earlier 
drafts. Thanks to John Parry and the Law Review editors for inviting me to this program. 
1 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by evenly divided Court, United States v. 
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
2 IRAP IV, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2014); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii 
III). 
3 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018). 
4 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 789 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii I), vacated as moot, Hawaii v. Trump, 874 
F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 604 (4th Cir. 
2017) (IRAP II), vacated as moot, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Washington 
v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017). 
5 Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 
3d 497, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
6 Chicago v. Sessions, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir. 2018). 
7 Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, 2017 WL 3189032, at *7 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
 
• District judges in the Eastern District of New York8 and Northern District of 
California9 enjoined enforcement of Trump Administration regulations rescinding 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program, which provided 
discretionary relief for removal for certain undocumented individuals who arrived 
as children. 
Regardless of the correctness of the constitutional and statutory analysis in 
these cases,10 a distinct problem involves the remedies imposed. Each of these 
courts issued or affirmed injunctions protecting or purporting to protect not only 
the named plaintiffs, but all persons. The injunctions prohibited or purported to 
prohibit enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, and policies not only 
against the named plaintiffs, but against all persons everywhere who might be 
subject to enforcement of those laws.11 
These broad injunctions are problematic in two respects. 
One problem involves nomenclature. Courts have labeled these “nationwide” 
or even “worldwide”12 injunctions. But the problem with these injunctions is that 
they prohibit government officials from enforcing the challenged laws, regulations, 
and policies against the universe of persons who might be subject to enforcement, 
regardless of whether they were parties to the lawsuit producing the injunction. 
These injunctions are better described as “universal,”13 a term that suggests 
something about the scope of the injunction with respect to who is protected and 
from what. “Nationwide” speaks more to where protected persons enjoy those 
protections. 
The second problem is that by any name courts should not issue such broad 
injunctions, certainly not as frequently, automatically, and seemingly unthinkingly as 
they have been in immigration cases. Although the Supreme Court and lower 
courts have issued or affirmed such injunctions in the past,14 issuance of universal 
                                                 
8 Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
9 Regents of Univ. of California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). 
10 For scholarship considering the constitutional issues, see generally, e.g., Josh Blackman, The 
Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L & POL. 213, 219 (2015); 
Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 96, 97 (2015); Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in 
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 88 (2016); Adam B. Cox and Christina M. Rodriguez, The 
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 107 (2015); Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant 
Covering, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 769 (2017); Christopher N. Lasch, et al, Understanding “Sanctuary 
Cities”, 58 B.C. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2018); Earl Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban, 
___ LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. ___ (2018). 
11 Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 
(2017); see IRAP IV, 883 F.3d at 272-73; Batalla Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 437; Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d 
at 951; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 539. 
12 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701, (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii III) 
13 Thanks to Tobias Wolff for suggesting the better term. Bray uses “national” injunction to capture 
the same idea of an injunction protecting beyond the plaintiffs. Bray, supra note 11, at 419 n.5. 
14 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 436 (4th ed. 2010); Bray, supra note 11, at 
437–45. 
 
injunctions has accelerated in recent years,15 even as courts16 and commentators17 
insist that they should not be routine. Courts and commentators offer a variety of 
reasons for issuing universal injunctions, from facial unconstitutionality18 to the 
constitutional demand for uniform immigration19 law20 to judicial economy and 
rule-of-law considerations that would be undermined if federal law were not 
enforced against some and enforced against others.21 None of these justifications 
withstands scrutiny. Universal injunctions remain inconsistent with the historic 
scope of courts’ equity powers, as informed by Article III of the Constitution.22 
They raise concerns for manipulative litigant behavior. And they are ungrounded in 
the needs of the cases—nothing about these cases or the challenged laws, 
regulations, and policies requires an injunction barring enforcement against all 
persons who might be subject to the law. 
As Samuel Bray argues, a “federal court should give an injunction that protects 
the plaintiff vis-à-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the defendant may 
both happen to be. The injunction should not constrain the defendant’s conduct 
vis-à-vis nonparties.”23 Douglas Laycock similarly argues that “the court in an 
individual action should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing 
an invalid regulation; the court should order only that the invalid regulation not be 
enforced against the individual plaintiff.”24 And as the Supreme Court stated in 
Doran v. Salem Inn,25 “neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere 
with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the 
particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may 
violate the statute.”26  
These scope-of-injunction concerns arise in constitutional litigation challenging 
local,27 state,28 and federal29 laws. The present immigration and immigration-
adjacent controversies discussed in this volume offer an appropriate opportunity to 
consider the problem of the universal injunction, what proper injunctions should 
                                                 
15 Bray, supra note 11, at 437. 
16 Id. 
17 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2018). 
18 Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208 at *2; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 507. 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress “to establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization”). 
20 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017) (IRAP II); Texas v. 
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015). 
21 Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208 at *4. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
23 Bray, supra note 11, at 469. 
24 Id. at 276. 
25 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 922 (1975). 
26 Id. at 931. 
27 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974). 
28 Strawser v. Strange, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1330 (S.D. Ala. 2015); Josh Blackman and Howard M. 
Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 244 (2016); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last Stand Against Marriage Equality in the Land of 
George Wallace, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2015). 
29 See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935); Bray, supra note 11, at 433–35. 
look like, and how constitutional litigation and adjudication should proceed under 
appropriately scoped judicial decrees, generally and in this class of actions. This 
Paper focuses on six sets of federal laws, regulations, and policies governing or 
related to immigration that have been subject to constitutional challenge in the past 
decade and that have produced universal (although labeled nationwide) injunctions 
barring enforcement of the law against all persons. 
Part I considers litigation in six areas of immigration or immigration-adjacent 
laws, regulations, and policies. Part II considers the nomenclature problem and 
explains why the phrase “universal injunction,” rather than “nationwide 
injunction,” better captures what courts have been doing. Part III argues that 
universal injunctions are inappropriate as a matter of equitable principle, judicial 
decisionmaking, and Article III of the Constitution, while considering and rejecting 
the arguments courts and commentators have offered for such orders. Part IV 
considers the appropriate scope of injunctions in the six immigration and 
immigration-adjacent areas and how litigation would proceed under properly 
scoped injunctions. 
 
I. Injunctions in Immigration and Immigration-Adjacent Controversies 
 
This Paper focuses on federal laws, regulations, and policies touching on 
immigration and immigration-adjacent matters because that is the focus of this 
volume and because these laws have been the targets of the highest-profile 
universal injunctions in the past several years. Although the cases described below 
label the injunctions “nationwide,” I will use the more-accurate “universal 
injunction.” For present purposes, I remain agnostic to whether the courts were 
correct in declaring these laws, regulations, and policies constitutionally or 
statutorily invalid. My focus is on the appropriate scope of the injunctive remedy 
upon a declaration of constitutional invalidity of the challenged laws, regulations, 
and policies. 
 
A. DAPA 
 
The litigation that started the recent wave of universal injunctions against 
federal immigration laws involved the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents30 (“DAPA”) program under President Obama, an 
extension of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).31  The basic 
idea was that certain qualified individuals—primarily childhood arrivals and parents 
of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents meeting additional conditions—who 
                                                 
30 SEC. JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain 
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (2014). 
31SEC. JANET NAPOLITANO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (2012). 
 
otherwise lack lawful immigration status in the United States would have their 
removals deferred (or moved lower on the removal priority list) as a matter of 
executive discretion and would become eligible for certain state and federal 
benefits.32 
Texas and 25 other states sued in the Southern District of Texas, alleging that 
DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act33 and the President’s 
constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”34 The 
district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of DAPA in any state—that is, the 
Department of Homeland Security could not defer removal or accord status 
benefits to persons anywhere in the United States.35 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.36 
As to the scope of the injunction, the court of appeals stated that partial 
implementation of DAPA outside the 26 plaintiff states would undermine the 
uniform and unified immigration law demanded by the Constitution and intended 
by Congress.37 It also would render the injunction ineffective, because DAPA 
beneficiaries from non-protected states remained free to move about the country 
and enter protected states such as Texas.38 
An eight-member Supreme Court affirmed the decision, including the universal 
injunction, by an evenly divided Court.39 
 
B. Travel Ban 
 
The highest-profile use of universal injunctions has been in the wave of federal 
litigation over President Trump’s “travel bans.” 
In March 2017, Trump issued Executive Order No. 13780, entitled “Protecting 
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.”40 The order 
imposed a 90-day ban on travel to the United States for nationals of six majority-
Muslim nations, ordered federal agencies to review procedures for granting visas 
for nationals of those nations, and ordered review of procedures for refugee 
                                                 
32 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146–49 (5th Cir. 2015). 
33 Id. at 149–50. 
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
35 Texas, 809 F.3d at 146. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 187–88. 
38 Id. at 188. 
39 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). The case was argued in spring 2016, during the 
fourteen-month period between the February 2016 death of Justice Scalia and the April 2017 
confirmation of Justice Gorsuch as his successor. Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to 
Improve the United States Supreme Court 2 (Ga. State Univ. College of Law), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2900555. 
40 Exec. Order No. 13780 of Mar. 6, 2017, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) (to be codified in 3 C.F.R. (2018)). 
 
admissions.41 Several lawsuits followed, challenging the validity of the order on 
First Amendment, equal protection, and statutory grounds. 
The States of Washington and Minnesota sued in the Western District of 
Washington. They argued that the order harmed the teaching and research missions 
of their universities by restricting students, faculty, and other visiting scholars and 
dignitaries who are nationals of the targeted countries and who are unable to study 
and work at those institutions.42 The district court granted a temporary restraining 
order, and the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay the order 
pending appeal, including its universal scope.43 The State of Hawaii and an 
individual sued in the District of Hawaii; Hawaii claimed similar injury to its 
universities, while the individual plaintiff claimed injury from the order preventing 
his Syrian-national mother-in-law from visiting the United States.44  
Three organizations and six individuals filed a separate action in the District of 
Maryland. The individual plaintiffs were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents 
whose family members would be prevented or delayed from entering the United 
States.45 The International Refugee Assistance Project46 (“IRAP”) and HIAS, Inc.47 
assist refugees in resettling in the United States. The Middle East Studies 
Association of North America is an organization of students and scholars of 
Middle East studies, whose academic work would be limited by being unable to 
interact with students and scholars from the targeted nations.48 The district court 
enjoined all enforcement and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, identifying three reasons 
for universality of the injunction—that plaintiffs are dispersed throughout the 
country, the need for uniform immigration law, and the unique nature of the 
Establishment Clause violation and the “message” of exclusion the order sent to 
plaintiffs and non-plaintiffs alike.49 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hawaii and IRAP and stayed the 
preliminary injunctions pending appeal, to the extent they prevented enforcement 
with respect to nationals lacking “any bona fide relationship with a person or entity 
in the United States.”50 It left the injunctions in effect “with respect to respondents 
and those similarly situated.”51 The second executive order expired by its terms in 
                                                 
41 Id. This order revoked the first executive order, issued in January, which sparked its own wave of 
emergency litigation. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of the Law, 
115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 78 (2017). 
42 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017). 
43 Id. at 1166–67. 
44 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 789 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii I). 
45 International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 548 (D. Md. 2017) (IRAP 
III). 
46 Id. at 548–49. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 549. 
49 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 604–05 (4th Cir. 2017) (IRAP II). 
50 Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 1, 9 (2017) (granting certiorari)). 
51 Id. 
 
fall 2017, prompting the Court to dismiss the appeals as moot, to vacate the lower 
court’s judgments, and to order dismissal of the actions as moot.52 
In September 2017, Trump issued Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing 
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United 
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.”53 This third travel order 
identified eight countries (two of which—North Korea and Venezuela—are not 
majority-Muslim) whose nationals should not be allowed entry to the United States. 
The district court in Hawaii again enjoined enforcement.54 The Ninth Circuit 
again affirmed a universal injunction, emphasizing the need for uniformity in 
immigration policy and that any application of the Proclamation to others beyond 
the plaintiffs would violate federal law.55 But the court rejected a “worldwide 
injunction” protecting foreign nationals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide 
relationship with a person or entity in the United States.56 
In IRAP, the district court enjoined enforcement of the Proclamation and 
again imposed the injunction universally, emphasizing the special problems of a law 
that violates the Establishment Clause with a message of ostracism that affects 
everyone, beyond the plaintiffs.57 The Fourth Circuit largely affirmed as to the six 
majority-Muslim countries, but not as to North Korea and Venezuela. It required 
that IRAP and other resettlement-organization plaintiffs similarly show a bona fide 
relationship with potential refugee clients that is “’formal, documented, and formed 
in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading the travel 
restrictions.”58 The universal scope was appropriate because plaintiffs are scattered 
throughout the country, making piecemeal injunction relief difficult; Congress has 
an interest in uniform immigration law; and enjoining enforcement of a regulation 
issued in violation of the Constitution only as to the plaintiff “would not cure its 
deficiencies.”59 
The Supreme Court granted cert in Hawaii,60 while leaving the IRAP petitions 
untouched, likely awaiting resolution of Hawaii. The Court ordered the parties to 
brief the scope of the injunction. Arguments in April 2018 included a brief 
exchange on scope-of-injunction, with Justice Gorsuch questioning counsel for 
Hawaii about the “really new development where a district court asserts the right to 
strike down a – a federal statute with regard to anybody anywhere in the world.”61 
 
                                                 
52 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 377, 377 (2017). 
53 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 
54 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 2017). 
55 Id. at 701–02. 
56 Id. 
57International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 632 (D. Md. 2017) (IRAP 
III). 
58 IRAP IV, 883 F.3d 233, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088)). 
59 Id. at 273. 
60 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018). 
61 Oral argument in Trump v. Hawaii 
 
C. “Sanctuary Cities” 
 
The Department of Justice imposed new conditions on federal programs 
providing grants to state, county, and municipal law enforcement. The regulations 
would require withholding of federal funds to “sanctuary cities” that failed or 
declined to assist the federal government in enforcing immigration laws, especially 
by notifying federal agencies of the identity and location of persons within those 
cities unlawfully present in the United States and by declining to continue to hold 
persons detained on state and local charges for additional periods to allow federal 
immigration officials to take them into immigration detention.62 
The County of Santa Clara and the City and County of San Francisco 
challenged the funding restrictions in the Northern District of California, arguing 
that the funding restrictions violated separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment, 
and Fifth Amendment due process.63 The district court preliminarily,64 then 
permanently,65 enjoined DOJ officials from enforcing the restrictions or stripping 
state and local law-enforcement agencies of federal funds. The district court 
enjoined the defendants from enforcing the regulations as to all funding of all state 
and local governments; it emphasized the facial unconstitutionality of the 
regulations and that the violations were not limited to Santa Clara and San 
Francisco, but applied to all jurisdictions nationwide.66 
The City of Chicago filed a similar action in the Northern District of Illinois, 
challenging the threat to withhold funds from one grant. That court also enjoined 
enforcement universally, finding “no reason to think that the legal issues present in 
this case are restricted to Chicago or that the statutory authority given to the 
Attorney General would differ in another jurisdiction.”67 
In denying a motion to stay the injunction pending appeal, the district court 
offered the first comprehensive analysis and justification for a universal injunction, 
emphasizing several points. The City made a facial challenge to the federal laws and 
regulations at issue, so the government’s power and the constitutional violation 
would be the same as to all entities nationwide.68 The district court cited cases 
issuing or affirming universal injunctions in immigration cases, with the Supreme 
Court at least tacitly validating the practice.69 Judicial economy counseled against 
requiring other jurisdictions to file their own lawsuits to obtain injunctions barring 
enforcement as to them (with the decision in Chicago serving as at-least persuasive 
authority), especially because 37 cities and counties had submitted amicus briefs in 
                                                 
62 Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. 
Supp. 3d 497, 509–11 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
63 Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 507. 
64 Id. at 508–09. 
65 Santa Clara v. Trump, 2017 WL 5569835 at *17 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
66 Id.; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 539. 
67 Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 951. 
68 Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
69 Id. 
 
support of Chicago.70 The court recognized recent scholarship raising concerns 
with the practice; it acknowledged that a universal injunction should not be the 
default approach, but should be limited to extraordinary cases.71 But this was the 
extraordinary case, given concerns for federal uniformity, the unfairness resulting 
from enforcement against some municipalities and not others, and concerns for the 
rule of law.72 
A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed, offering a similarly 
comprehensive defense of universal injunctions.73 While agreeing that universal 
injunctions “should be utilized only in rare circumstances”74 and that they were “a 
powerful remedy that should be employed with discretion,”75 the majority justified 
the universal injunction in this case because it presented “essentially a facial 
challenge to a policy applied nationwide” and the format of the policy rendered 
individual relief ineffective in providing full relief.76 Although the panel was 
unanimous in declaring the funding regulations constitutionally invalid and 
enjoining DOJ from stripping funds from Chicago, Judge Manion criticized the 
universality of the injunction as a “gratuitous application of an extreme remedy.”77 
 
D. Regulating Attorneys in Immigration Proceedings 
 
The Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”), part of DOJ, enforces 
regulations of attorneys practicing in immigration proceedings. One regulation 
required attorneys to file a notice of appearance when the attorney engaged in 
“practice” or “preparation” in a proceeding, the latter including incidental advice, 
activities, or preparation, even those activities outside full representation.78 The 
effect of the regulation was that attorneys must appear and undertake full legal 
representation in cases, whereas attorney and advocacy groups often provided 
limited assistance for parties otherwise proceeding pro se.79 
The Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (“NWIRP”) provides legal services in 
immigration proceedings in Washington, sometimes appearing as counsel and 
sometimes advising pro se litigants. It received a cease-and-desist letter from EOIR, 
                                                 
70 Id. at *3. 
71 Id. at *4. 
72 Id. at *4–5. 
73 Chicago v. Sessions, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2018). 
74 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 26) 
75 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 29). 
76 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 30). 
77 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 42 (Manion, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
78 Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, 2017 WL 3189032, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
79 Id Northwest Immigrant Rights Project79 (“NWIRP”) illustrates the distinction. The injunction was 
properly and appropriately nationwide in that by prohibiting the federal government from enforcing 
the attorney regulations on NWIRP, the district court necessary prohibited enforcement of the 
regulations against NWIRP anywhere in the United States it may attempt to provide legal services in 
immigration proceedings. NWIRP works in Washington,79. at *1–2. 
 
ordering it to stop providing any assistance in any proceedings without appearing 
and providing full representation, something NWIRP alleged it lacked resources to 
do.80 NWIRP filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that the 
regulations violated the First Amendment, by interfering with communications 
between NWIRP and parties to immigration proceedings, and the Tenth 
Amendment, by infringing on the state power to regulate attorneys.81 The court 
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the cease-and-desist letter and the regulations 
pursuant to which the letter issued. It recognized EOIR’s stated intention to 
enforce the regulations to other attorneys and applied the injunction to “any other 
similarly situated non-profit organizations who, like NWIRP, self-identify and 
disclose their assistance on pro se filings.”82 
 
E. Abortion Access for Detained Undocumented Unaccompanied Minors 
 
This is the class of immigration-adjacent litigation that did not produce an 
unwarranted universal injunction, but instead proceeded according to appropriate 
remedial procedures. Plaintiffs challenged policies of the Office of Refugee 
Settlement (an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services) refusing 
to allow unaccompanied undocumented minors in Health and Human Services 
(HHS) detention to terminate pregnancies.83 A lawsuit filed by a guardian ad litem 
produced two district court injunctions compelling HHS to permit three girls 
(identified as J.D., J.R., and J.P.) to obtain abortions.84 The judge expressly 
prohibited HHS officials from interfering or retaliating against the three girls for 
obtaining abortions, but made no mention of, and did not extend the order to, 
other, similarly situated detainees.85 
The district then certified a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2) of “all pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are 
or will be in the legal custody of the federal government” and granted a class-wide 
preliminary injunction.86 
                                                 
80 Id. at *2. 
81 Id. at *2–6. 
82 Id. at *7. 
83 Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (order denying stay); id. at 736 
(Millett, J., concurring); id. at 743 (Henderson, J., dissenting); see also Marty Lederman, Lawless and 
Cruel: The HHS Abortion Scandal That’s Flying Under the Radar, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/12/lawless-and-cruel-hhs-abortion-scandal.html [hereinafter 
Lederman, Lawless and Cruel]; Marty Lederman, The SG’s Remarkable Cert. Petition in Hargan v. Garza, the 
“Jane Doe” Abortion Case, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 8, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-
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F. DACA Rescission 
 
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security created DACA, a program 
permitting certain individuals without lawful immigration status who entered the 
United States as children to obtain contingent discretionary relief from deportation 
and authorization to work legally in the United States. In 2017, DHS announced a 
gradual end to DACA.87 
In the Northern District of California, five groups of plaintiffs filed non-class 
actions. The plaintiffs were the President and Regents of the University of 
California, four states, a city, a county, a union, and several individual DACA 
recipients; they argued the rescission violated the APA. The district agreed the new 
order was invalid and ordered DHS to “maintain the DACA program on a 
nationwide basis.”88  It insisted that the scope of the injunction was appropriate 
given the strong interest in uniform immigration law and the problem of DACA 
rescission affecting every state and territory of the United States. “Limiting relief to 
the States in suit or the Individual Plaintiffs would result in administrative 
confusion and simply provoke many thousands of individual lawsuits all over the 
country.”89 
A different group of plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of New York. 
Plaintiffs included individuals and fifteen states and the District of Columbia, 
alleging violations of Equal Protection and Due Process and the APA. The district 
court enjoined DACA rescission “on a universal or ‘nationwide’ basis,” using the 
terms synonymously.90 It insisted it did not do so “lightly” and recognized 
commentary criticizing the practice.91 It emphasized the strong federal interest in 
uniform immigration law, as well as how impractical it would be to issue a narrower 
injunction that sufficiently protected plaintiffs’ interest, in light of the ability of 
people to move from state to state and job to job.92 
A third action was brought in the District of the District of Columbia by two 
sets of plaintiffs, one led by Princeton University and one of its graduates (a DACA 
recipient) and one led by the NAACP and two labor unions.93 The court rejected 
the government’s argument that any remedy should be limited to the plaintiffs, 
citing Texas and the need for uniform immigration law.94 Rather than enjoining 
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enforcement of the rescission regulation, the court  vacated the order rescinding 
DACA as lacking sufficient reasoned explanation, but stayed the vacatur to give the 
department a chance to offer a fuller and proper justification for the order.95 
 
II. Universal (Not Nationwide) 
 
The first problem with these broad injunctions involves nomenclature, in 
labeling them “nationwide” injunctions rather than “universal” injunctions. 
The scope of an injunction involves two distinct considerations—“who” and 
“where.” “Who” refers to the persons protected and bound by the injunction—
who enjoys the blanket of the court’s power, who can return to court to enforce the 
injunction if it is disobeyed, and who is bound to act or refrain from acting in some 
respect.96 “Where” refers to the “territorial breadth” or geographic scope of the 
order, where the injunction and court’s enforcement power can find those 
protected or bound by an injunction. In the context of pre-enforcement 
constitutional litigation at issue, “where” means the place in the country the 
government is barred from enforcing the law; “who” means against what persons it 
is barred from enforcing the challenged law and against what persons it remains 
free from judicial decree to enforce the challenged law. 
Courts conflate these distinct aspects in describing the central choice as 
between nationwide relief and relief limited to the plaintiffs.97 One judge in the 
Northern District of California erroneously framed the issue as whether the 
injunction “should be issued only with regards to the plaintiffs and should not 
apply nationwide.”98 The Seventh Circuit spoke of “relief limited in geographic 
scope” producing multiple litigation,99 misunderstanding that multiple litigation 
(involving new parties) derives from the limited “who” of an individual injunction, 
not from the broader “where.” At the same time, the terms should not be used 
interchangeably or synonymously.100 
It is “inapt”101 to describe these injunctions as nationwide or to justify them on 
the conclusion that plaintiffs “established injury that reaches beyond the 
geographical bounds” of the judicial district or state.102 Both framings speak to the 
injunction’s where. So understood, all injunctions are and should be nationwide and 
should reach beyond the geographical bounds of the issuing judicial district. All 
injunctions should protect the plaintiff against defendants’ unconstitutional or 
unlawful conduct throughout the nation, wherever the plaintiff may be or should 
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go.  That is, government officials are and should be prohibited from enforcing the 
constitutionally defective law or regulation against the protected party wherever the 
protected party may be or should go. Rights are violated by threatened enforcement 
of a constitutionally defective law wherever the rights-holder goes, and the 
injunction protecting her against those rights violations protects her wherever she 
goes. 
The significant feature of the injunctions in these immigration cases is that they 
prohibit enforcement of the challenged law, regulation, or policy against the 
universe of people who might be subject to enforcement of the challenged law, 
regulation or policy, whether parties to the constitutional litigation or otherwise. 
The injunctions attempt to prohibit government officials from enforcing the 
challenged laws against the universe of all persons and entities, not only the named 
plaintiffs. Justice Gorsuch recognized the problem as injunctions “not limited to 
relief for the parties at issue” striking down “a federal statute with regard to 
anybody anywhere in the world.”103  The appropriate term for such injunctions 
reaching a broad “who” is “universal,” because they purport to bar enforcement 
against the universe of people, parties or otherwise, against whom the challenged 
law might be enforced. 
Because “nationwide” and “universal” address different aspects of the scope of 
a judicial order, they are not synonymous or interchangeable—an injunction can be 
both nationwide and universal. Injunctions are nationwide in protecting the named 
plaintiffs against enforcement of the constitutionally defective laws throughout the 
nation, wherever the plaintiffs are or go; that is proper and unremarkable. This is 
consistent with Califano v. Yamasaki,104 where the Supreme Court approved 
application of an injunction that protected a plaintiff class spread throughout the 
country, because the entire class was before the court and the court’s equitable 
powers allowed it to protect those before it, regardless of their location.105 
Injunctions are nationwide because injunctions should be nationwide, at least where 
plaintiffs are persons who may move around the country and might be subject to 
the challenged law, regulation, or policy throughout the nation. Injunctions become 
universal (although courts have not used the term) in purporting to protect the 
universe of people from enforcement of the constitutionally defective laws, 
regulations, and policies. 
NWIRP106 illustrates the distinction. By prohibiting the federal government 
from enforcing the attorney regulations against NWIRP, the district court 
necessarily prohibited enforcement of the regulations against NWIRP anywhere in 
the United States it may attempt to provide legal services in immigration 
proceedings. NWIRP works in Washington,107 so the injunction obviously prohibits 
enforcement in proceedings held there. But if NWIRP began providing legal 
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services in immigration proceedings in Oregon or Texas or Florida or Maine, the 
injunction would bar enforcement of the regulations in those proceedings. The 
protection that the injunction afforded to NWIRP against enforcement applied 
wherever NWIRP was and wherever it might otherwise be subject to enforcement. 
This made the injunction properly and appropriately nationwide. The problem is 
that the district court extended the “who” of the injunction, purporting and 
intending to protect other immigration attorneys and representation organizations 
against enforcement of those regulations. It prohibited enforcement of the 
challenged regulations not only against NWIRP, but against all other attorneys and 
representation organizations.108 
Chicago v. Sessions109 similarly wielded the wrong nomenclature. The injunction 
should protect Chicago nationwide, ensuring it retains its federal funding 
everywhere it goes—although that has no practical effect because the City of 
Chicago, unlike NWIRP, cannot leave the Northern District of Illinois. Butr he 
district court made, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, an extended “who” by 
purporting and intending to protect other sanctuary cities from losing their funding 
to DOJ regulations. 
Bray recognizes that it is more appropriate to speak of the scope of an 
injunction in terms of universality than nationwide, but expresses concern that 
universality may fail to capture “the distinctive fact that these injunctions constrain 
the national government, as opposed to state governments.”110 But universality—
enjoining the defendant’s constitutionally defective conduct with respect to the 
universe of prospective enforcement targets—remains the central idea and central 
problem, regardless of the source of the challenged law. The difference between a 
universal injunction prohibiting enforcement of a federal law and a universal 
injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law is the size of the universes against 
whom enforcement is proscribed. But the concept remains appropriate. 
In Koontz v. Watson, the District of Kansas declared constitutionally invalid a 
Kansas law requiring all persons who contract with the state to certify that they are 
not involved in boycotts of Israel.111 The plaintiff, a teacher hired to conduct 
teacher-training programs, alleged that the law violated the First Amendment and 
the court agreed. The injunction prohibited the state from enforcing any statute, 
law, policy, or practice requiring independent contractors to declare that they are 
not participating in a boycott of Israel and prohibited the state “from requiring any 
independent contractor” to certify that they are not participating in a boycott of 
Israel as a condition of contracting with the state.112 That injunction was 
universal—prohibiting enforcement of any state laws  against any potential 
contractors with the state, regardless of who those contractors are, where they are, 
what they are contracting for, and what laws they are subject to. 
                                                 
108 Id. at * 7. 
109 Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d ___ F.3d ___ (7th 
Cir. 2018). 
110 Id. at 419 n.5. 
111 Koontz v. Watson, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ , 2018 WL 617894, *1 (D. Kan. 2018). 
112 Id. at ___*14. 
An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law should be as nationwide 
as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of federal law—it should protect the 
plaintiff against enforcement of the constitutionally defective state law everywhere 
she is or goes in the United States. This is less of a practical problem with state laws 
because of constitutional and prudential limits on extraterritorial application of state 
laws. But that renders a nationwide injunction unnecessary; it does not render the 
terminology inapplicable. If a court enjoins Florida from enforcing a law 
prohibiting flag-burning against the plaintiff, the injunction prohibits Alabama from 
enforcing that law anywhere the plaintiff might burn a flag. Limits on 
extraterritorial application of Florida’s flag-burning law also prohibit that 
prosecution. 
While calling beyond-the-plaintiff injunctions “nationwide” is inappropriate, 
universality is not the only available term to capture the real issue of “who.” Bray 
uses “national” to describe an injunction protecting the “nation” of persons against 
enforcement.113 Justice Gorsuch, perhaps sarcastically, called it a “cosmic 
injunction.”114 Michael Morley frames the issue around the “orientation” of the 
injunction. A plaintiff-oriented injunction “vindicates the plaintiffs’ rights, but 
otherwise leaves the underlying statute or regulation undisturbed.”115 A defendant-
oriented injunction allows a single judge in one case “to completely prohibit the 
defendant agency or official from enforcing the challenged provision against 
anyone throughout the state or nation,” the equivalent of a universal injunction.116 
With the proper terms in mind, it should be clear that the problem with the 
injunctions in these immigration and immigration-adjacent cases has not been their 
nationwide scope, in protecting prevailing plaintiffs everywhere. The point of 
contention and controversy has been their universality in protecting a universe of 
people beyond the plaintiff. 
Part III turns to that problem. 
 
III. Never Appropriate, By Any Label 
 
By any label, courts should not issue the universal injunctions they have in 
these cases, which prohibit defendant federal officials from enforcing the 
challenged laws, regulations, and policies against the universe of any person 
anywhere who may be subject to enforcement, beyond the named plaintiffs in 
those cases. They certainly should not issue as frequently, unthinkingly, and 
automatically as they have been. “Universal” injunctions were not unheard-of prior 
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to Texas v. United States and these cases; the practice traces to the 1960s and ‘70s.117 
But their issuance has accelerated in recent years.118 
 Whatever courts have done descriptively, universal injunctions are normatively 
inappropriate. As Bray argues, a “federal court should give an injunction that 
protects the plaintiff vis-à-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the 
defendant may both happen to be. The injunction should not constrain the 
defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis nonparties.”119 Laycock agrees that the power to issue 
injunctions that protect beyond the plaintiffs in individual actions is “rather 
doubtful.”120 He similarly proposes that “the court in an individual action should 
not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing an invalid regulation; the 
court should order only that the invalid regulation not be enforced against the 
individual plaintiff.”121 The Supreme Court endorsed this limited scope for 
injunctions in Doran v. Salem Inn,122 stating that “neither declaratory nor injunctive 
relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances 
except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to 
prosecute others who may violate the statute.”123  
This Part offers the scholarly case against universal injunctions and shows the 
problems with the judicial justifications for universal injunctions in these cases. 
 
A. Equitable Principles and the Scope of Injunctions 
 
Two competing principles guide courts in defining the proper scope of an 
injunction. First, the “scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the 
[constitutional] violation established”124 and the injunctive remedy should be 
commensurate with and match the constitutional violation.125 Second, “injunctive 
relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 
complete relief to the plaintiffs.”126 Courts in these immigration cases have justified 
universal injunctions by reference to both the remedy-matches-the-violation127 and 
the no-more-burdensome128 principles. 
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1. Conceptualizing constitutional litigation 
 
Whether either stated principle supports a universal injunction depends on how 
courts conceptualize constitutional litigation, what is before a court in 
constitutional litigation, and what the court is asked to do in resolving the case. The 
trend towards universal injunctions reflects a conceptual shift in that judicial 
understanding. 
Historically, constitutional litigation sought anti-suit injunctions, in which a 
plaintiff sought federal-court orders directing public officials to halt enforcement of 
the challenged law in a judicial proceeding initiated against the federal plaintiffs.129 
The court declares the constitutional validity of the challenged law, but as an 
incident of preventing or remedying the wrong to the individual130 and only to the 
extent the government defendants threatened to enforce the law against the 
plaintiff.131 Kevin Walsh describes pre-enforcement constitutional action as an “in 
personam litigation in which the court is asked to decide the respective rights and 
duties of persons under law. If the plaintiff's preenforcement challenge is 
successful, the remedy issued runs against the defendant as a person.”132 If a law or 
regulation is (in the language of Marbury v. Madison,133) “repugnant” to the 
Constitution, a court must refuse to apply it as a rule of decision.134 A court issuing 
an anti-suit injunction prohibits public officials from initiating an enforcement 
proceeding, thereby prohibiting the challenged law or regulation from serving as 
the rule of decision in that underlying proceeding.  
Conceptualizing constitutional rights and litigation this way, a court should not 
make the injunction universal because the point of the action is not the declaration 
of the law’s constitutional validity, but halting enforcement of the challenged law as 
to the plaintiff.135 The paradigm constitutional case for this model is Ex Parte 
Young,136 which recognized preemptive constitutional actions by potential 
enforcement defendants (the railroad and its officers) against executive officials (the 
state attorney general) to halt enforcement of constitutionally defective laws against 
it.137  
Either scope-of-injunction principle supports limiting injunctions to the 
plaintiffs. Consider Chicago v. Sessions. DOJ threatened to deny federal law-
enforcement funds to Chicago, pursuant to federal regulations, because Chicago 
operates as a sanctuary jurisdiction and refuses to aid federal enforcement of 
immigration laws. Chicago obtains complete relief if the injunction prohibits DOJ 
from enforcing those regulations and from denying funds to Chicago; Chicago’s 
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relief does not lose complete relief and its relief does not become less than 
complete if DOJ denies funds to San Francisco or Santa Clara. Similarly, the 
constitutional violation is the denial of funds to Chicago pursuant to the 
regulations, not the regulations themselves; an injunction prohibiting enforcement 
of the regulations and denial of funds to Chicago matches and remedies, and is 
commensurate with, the constitutional violation in the case. 
But federal courts and litigants have adopted a new conception of 
constitutional rights and constitutional litigation. On this conception, the court’s 
power is directed not to protecting an individual or entity against enforcement of a 
constitutionally defective law or regulation, but to attacking the defective law or 
regulation itself. Judges see themselves as “invalidating” or “striking down” or 
“setting aside” or “nullifying” or “blocking” unconstitutional laws, acting against 
the constitutionally defective law itself to eliminate and render it non-existent.138 
The challenged law or regulation is treated as a res on which the court acts for all 
purposes and all persons.139 
If the court’s determination of constitutional invalidity “obliterates” the law, a 
universal injunction has “relentless logic,”140 offering a remedy that logically must 
benefit all persons and purposes from an entirely invalid law. If a law as a thing is 
unconstitutional, it is undeserving of any respect,  and continued enforcement to 
anyone, anywhere, would suggest the law retains that respect. If the constitutional 
violation is the very existence of the law, then only a universal injunction is 
commensurate with and matches that violation. 
Courts issuing universal injunctions in these immigration cases rely on this 
newer conception of constitutional litigation. Courts target the “legal issues” raised 
in the case, considering the laws challenged and the constitutional flaws in those 
laws, all of which apply nationwide and not limited to the particular plaintiff.141 The 
legal problems in denying sanctuary cities funding were not restricted to Chicago, 
because the authority impermissibly wielded by the Attorney General in denying (or 
threatening to deny) funding would be the same in Chicago as in another 
jurisdiction.142 A limited injunction could not resolve the constitutional defects of 
the funding regulations themselves. 
In rejecting the government’s argument for a non-universal injunction in 
Chicago, the court insisted that a narrower injunction would “allow the Attorney 
General to impose what this Court has ruled are likely unconstitutional conditions 
across a number of jurisdictions” and to “continue enforcing likely invalid 
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conditions” against other cities and counties.143 Santa Clara similarly insisted that 
the “constitutional violations” it found in the funding regulations “apply equally to 
all states and local jurisdictions.”144 The Fourth Circuit in IRAP II stated that 
enjoining the federal government only as to the plaintiffs “would not cure the 
constitutional deficiency, which would endure” in all other applications of the 
executive order.145 In IRAP IV, the same court insisted that because “we find that 
the Proclamation was issued in violation of the Constitution, enjoining it only as to 
Plaintiffs would not cure its deficiencies,” which “endure” in all other applications 
of the executive order.146 
This conception, Jonathan Mitchell argues, sees judicial review as a writ of 
erasure. A “judicial pronouncement of unconstitutionality has canceled or blotted 
out a duly enacted statute.”147 Non-enforcement of a statute becomes suspension 
or revocation.148 
 
It is not clear when the conceptual shift occurred,149 although it can be tied to 
two developments. Bray points to enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act150 in 
1934 as changing the constitutional understanding; by allowing courts to “declare” 
rights, it encouraged judges to think of litigation as a challenge to the law itself.151 A 
second change is the expansion of Ex Parte Young152 beyond antisuit injunctions153 
to all lawsuits seeking “relief properly characterized as prospective” from 
enforcement of constitutionally defective laws, regardless of the form of that 
enforcement.154 Pre-enforcement injunctive actions seek to halt not only judicial 
proceedings to enforce the challenged law (such as the threatened criminal 
prosecution in Young),155 but non-judicial enforcement actions by non-judicial 
actors, such as a county clerk denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple156 or 
Marshals shackling defendants during criminal proceedings157 or DOJ denying a 
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sanctuary municipality federal funds.158 The prospective relief no longer is about 
stopping a discrete judicial proceeding involving enforcement of a law against 
discrete parties; it is about eliminating the challenged law itself. 
Frost frames the dueling conceptions of constitutional litigation in terms of 
dueling conceptions of the judicial role—between resolving disputes between 
parties and declaring the meaning of the law for everyone. She argues that critics of 
universal injunctions view the primary judicial role as resolving individual disputes, 
with the law-declaration power as incidental to that primary role.159 The newer 
conception of constitutional litigation conforms to a shifted focus to the law-
declaration role. 
 
2. In Defense of the Traditional Conception 
 
The traditional conception, and the particularized, non-universal injunctions 
the traditional conception supports, represents a more appropriate approach to 
constitutional litigation for three reasons. It better describes what happens in 
constitutional litigation, it is more consistent with Article III limits on the 
jurisdiction of federal courts, and it better controls litigant behavior. 
 
a. Describing Constitutional Litigation 
 
The traditional conception better describes what happens in constitutional 
litigation. 
One way to see this is by imagining these constitutional issues resolved not in 
preemptive actions initiated by the right-holders enjoining enforcement, but in a 
government-initiated enforcement action. Government enforces the challenged law 
by initiating an enforcement proceeding against the rights-holder, who raises the 
constitutional validity of the law being enforced as a defense to enforcement 
liability. If the court agrees that the law is constitutionally invalid, it dismisses the 
action or otherwise resolves the proceeding in favor of the rights-holder. The 
court’s order dismissing the enforcement action speaks to the rights-holding 
defendant, but does not speak to or affect other people. Nor does it affect the law 
itself, which remains undisturbed.160 This is Marbury—understanding that a law or 
regulation is repugnant to the Constitution, the court refuses to apply it as rule of 
decision in that proceeding, leaving no valid law to be applied and requiring 
dismissal of the proceeding.161  
Consider, again, the attorney regulations in NWIRP. If NWIRP continues to 
advise pro se litigants without filing the required notice of appearance, EOIR would 
institute a disciplinary proceeding against NWIRP within the immigration court. 
NWIRP would defend in the proceeding by arguing that the attorney regulations 
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are repugnant to the First Amendment and cannot form the basis for disciplining it, 
based on the same arguments as in the preemptive suit in federal court. And if the 
body hearing the attorney-disciplinary action agrees that the regulations are 
constitutionally invalid, it would find in favor of NWIRP and resolve the 
disciplinary proceeding in its favor, finding no constitutionally valid regulation to 
use as the rule of decision. But that remedy, even if based on a finding of a 
constitutional defect in the regulations, protects only NWIRP, no other attorneys 
or representative organizations. It follows that the preemptive federal injunctive 
action NWIRP files to prohibit EOIP from commencing future disciplinary 
proceedings against it should produce an injunctive remedy that similarly protects 
only NWIRP. 
A second way to see this is to identify the precise constitutional violation. The 
violation is neither the enactment nor existence of an unconstitutional law, 
regulation, or policy; the violation is the enforcement or threatened enforcement of 
that law, regulation, or policy against particular persons. Describing the remedy as 
“striking down the law”162 or “declaring the law unconstitutional” does not 
accurately describe the results or effects of litigation. A law declared constitutionally 
invalid does not disappear—it remains in the United States Code and Congress is 
not compelled to repeal or amend it. The court’s judgment prevents enforcement 
of the law by those executive officers charged with carrying out legislative 
directives,163 with enforcement requiring a particular target. It follows that an 
injunction preventing that enforcement against the target remedies the 
constitutional violation, without having to do more. 
Mitchell labels this the “writ-of-erasure fallacy,” defined as “the assumption 
that a judicial pronouncement of unconstitutionality has canceled or blotted out a 
duly enacted statute, when the court’s ruling is in fact more limited in scope and 
leaves room for the statute to continue to operate.”164 Judges, politicians, and the 
public regard “judicially disapproved statutes” as legal nullities, although they 
remain on the books and continue to operate as law, a mindset that “has needlessly 
truncated the scope and effect of many federal and state statutes.”165 Instead, “[a]ll 
a court can do is decline to enforce the statute and enjoin the executive from 
enforcing it.”166 The injunction is “nothing more than a judicially imposed non-
enforcement policy.”167 Mitchell’s proper conception of the effect of judicial review 
can merge with the party-specific narrowness of ordinary litigation to produce 
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particularized, non-universal injunctions, stopping the executive from enforcing as 
to particular persons, not as to the universe.168 
 
b. Article III Limits 
 
The traditional conception and non-universal, particularized injunctive relief 
better conforms to limits on the power of federal courts. 
Federal courts possess power under Article III to decide “case[s]” and 
“controvers[ies],”169 which means power to decide cases or controversies for 
particular parties to a particular legal dispute.170 Courts do not decide general or 
abstract legal issues to provide remedies for people not before the court.171 Morley 
frames this around standing. A plaintiff has Article III standing to obtain injunctive 
relief only by showing that she suffers ongoing, impending, or substantially likely 
harm, usually from the threatened enforcement of the challenged law against her.172 
The existence of a law, without a credible threat of enforcement of that law against 
her, is insufficient to confer standing.173 Threats of enforcement to persons other 
than the plaintiff are insufficient to confer standing on that plaintiff.174 Nor are 
generalized threats of enforcement as to the public as a whole that are not specific 
or unique to the plaintiff.175 
Universal injunctions become possible because of what Aaron-Andrew Bruhl 
derides as the “one good plaintiff” rule—courts adjudicate, and provide a broad 
equitable remedy in, multi-party actions so long as one plaintiff can show standing, 
without determining standing for every plaintiff.176 They do so believing that an 
injunctive applies to everyone, so is necessary to find only one person with 
standing. The Fourth Circuit proceeded to the constitutional merits of the challenge 
to the travel after finding that one individual plaintiff had standing, deeming it 
unnecessary to consider standing of other plaintiffs, such as IRAP or the scholarly 
association.177 The Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States similarly stopped its 
standing inquiry with Texas.178 Bruhl argues that courts would be more constrained 
in issuing remedies if they were more constrained in thinking about standing. If 
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judges consider the standing of every plaintiff, they may better consider how to 
protect the interests of the plaintiffs without going beyond that scope to protect the 
universe of similarly situated persons.179 
Standing law reveals two things. The constitutional problem is not the 
existence of a constitutionally defective law, but the threat of enforcement of that 
constitutionally defective law against particular persons. Having identified a plaintiff 
with standing, the court cannot grant relief “that would not prevent likely, 
impending, or ongoing harm to the plaintiff herself.”180 That limitation includes 
relief that goes beyond preventing harm to the plaintiff by attempting to prevent 
harm to people not before the court, where unnecessary to prevent harm to the 
plaintiff. 
Califano v. Yamasaki181 assumes this party specificity, which lower courts have 
ignored in issuing universal injunctions in immigration cases. Courts quote Califano 
for the complete-relief principle, that an injunction should be no more burdensome 
than necessary to accord complete relief.182 But the oft-quoted sentence describing 
the complete-relief requirement ends with three oft-ignored words—“to the 
plaintiffs.”183 A court must ensure that the plaintiff obtains complete relief, but 
need not ensure that anyone else obtains complete relief. And the failure to accord 
relief beyond the plaintiff does not deprive the plaintiff of complete relief. Califano 
relied on the traditional conception of an injunction that stops enforcement as to 
the parties, not the new conception of providing freedom for the universe from a 
constitutionally defective law. Those three words in Califano were intentional and 
essential to the Court’s conception of constitutional litigation and cannot be 
disregarded as the lower courts have.184 
Amanda Frost argues that Article III does not necessarily limit courts’ 
adjudicatory or remedial authority to the plaintiffs, pointing to the mootness 
doctrine of “capable of repetition yet evading review.”185 A case is not moot (or 
mootness will be excepted) when, although the named plaintiff is not presently 
harmed or threatened with future harm, the injury is reasonably likely to reoccur in 
the future and the claim is so transitory that the injury would cease of its own force 
before litigation (including all appeals) could be completed.186 Common 
applications of capable-of-repetition include in constitutional challenges to holiday-
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season religious displays (the holiday season lasts approximately one month)187 and 
to laws restricting abortion (the pregnancy ends within, at most, nine months).188 
Courts hear these cases despite potential mootness, because they otherwise would 
never have an opportunity to adjudicate and resolve important constitutional issues 
arising in these time-sensitive contexts. 
For a case to not be moot under this doctrine, the injury must be capable of 
repetition as to the plaintiff, through a showing that she will be subjected to the 
challenged unlawful conduct in the future.189 The plaintiff must show that she will 
encounter the constitutionally invalid religious display in the future or that she 
might become pregnant and seek an abortion (and be injured by potential 
enforcement of the abortion restriction) in the future. That a non-party might be 
injured through enforcement of the same abortion restriction or the erection of the 
religious display in the future does not avoid mootness. The court’s Article III 
jurisdiction remains bound to future enforcement or threatened enforcement 
against this plaintiff, not against the universe of non-party individuals who might be 
subject to future enforcement. If one plaintiff brings an individual action 
challenging a seasonal religious display then moves out of the state, the court would 
find the case moot, even though the government may erect the display the 
following year, causing constitutional injury to non-parties offended by the display. 
One of those non-parties would have to establish standing and join or file a new 
lawsuit challenging the future display. 
Finally, neither of the explanations discussed above justifies the shift in 
conception of constitutional litigation from injuries caused by individualized 
enforcement of the law to injuries caused by the existence of the law itself.190 To 
the extent the shift derives from the creation of the declaratory judgment, it 
misunderstands that remedy. The Declaratory Judgment Act empowers courts to 
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party;” it permits 
determinations of the rights of interested parties to the federal litigation, rather than 
permitting free-standing declarations of rights in the abstract. The statute speaks of 
parties, which has a known meaning in litigation, rather than persons, which might 
consider people beyond the parties. Declaratory judgments also do not place the 
law itself before the court, but the rights and relations of particular people with 
respect to that law. 
In Doran v. Salem Inn,191 the Court endorsed particularized, non-universal 
remedies as to both injunctive and declaratory relief, showing that the declaratory 
judgment remedy operates to protect parties against enforcement of the challenged 
law, as does the injunctive remedy.192 And the Court has emphasized that 
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injunctions and declaratory judgments have the same practical effect.193 If 
injunctions are limited to protecting the plaintiffs and do not prohibit enforcement 
of the challenged laws against non-parties, then declaratory judgments must be 
similarly limited. Declaratory relief is narrower than injunctive relief in not 
imposing an immediate prohibition on the defendant’s conduct, but relying on the 
persuasive force of the judgment to convince state officials to rethink the law and 
its enforcement.194 Declaratory judgments are famously a “milder alternative” to the 
“strong medicine’” of the injunction.195 If the stronger injunction controls 
government officials only as to the plaintiffs, the milder declaratory remedy should 
not carry a broader “who” in its scope. 
 
As to the expansion of Ex Parte Young beyond antisuit injunctions, these cases 
still involve threatened enforcement of a law against particular individuals. All that 
has changed is that enforcement occurs in a non-judicial context—the couple 
seeking a marriage license, the defendant shackled without cause, or the 
municipality denied federal funds. That the enforcement mechanism is 
administrative rather than judicial does not change that the focus remains on the 
risk or threatened enforcement as to an identifiable individual. 
 
c. Litigant Behavior 
 
The prospect that one district judge can enjoin enforcement of a law as to the 
universe of targets also promotes forum-shopping and plaintiff-shopping. Those 
opposed to the target laws, regulations, and policies seek the right plaintiffs and the 
right court to take-out the law in all applications in one judicial shot. When Texas 
and other Republican-led states sought to challenge immigrant-friendly policies of 
the Obama Administration, Texas took the lead and filed suit in the Southern 
District of Texas, with review in the Fifth Circuit. Beneficiaries of those policies 
went to federal court in New York for a ruling that the policies remained 
enforceable in other states. Opponents of the Trump Administration’s 
immigration-restricting policies found plaintiffs with family or associates seeking 
entry to the United States and focused their litigation efforts in Hawaii, 
Washington, and California, with review in the Ninth Circuit, or Maryland, with 
review in the Fourth Circuit. It is neither an accident nor a surprise that Austin, 
Texas did not challenge the sanctuary-city restrictions in the Fifth Circuit.196 
Forum- or plaintiff-shopping is not inherently problematic. But universal 
injunctions make it risk-free and asymmetrical, allowing plaintiffs to, in Bray’s 
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words, “shop ’til the statute drops.”197 If Court I declares the law constitutionally 
valid, that decision has no preclusive effect on non-parties to that action; a different 
plaintiff can file a separate challenge to the same law in Court II,198 subject to some 
precedential effect (depending on what court addressed the challenged law in Court 
I).199 If Court I declares the challenged law invalid and issues a universal injunction, 
it ends the game200—the challenged law is unenforceable against anyone anywhere, 
unless the universal injunction is reversed on appeal. Non-parties need not take the 
extra steps of joining the action and expanding the injunction or obtaining their 
own injunctions.201 For efficiency’s sake, challengers will find the right plaintiffs and 
the right court and halt enforcement as quickly as possible. But they incur no cost 
(other than the risk of ongoing enforcement) if they guess wrong and must take a 
second bite at the apple. 
 
3. Non-Universality in every court 
 
The impropriety of universal injunctions (or the demand for particularized 
injunctions) does not vary by court. Universal injunctions are inappropriate because 
a court should not prohibit government from enforcing the challenged laws, 
regulations, or policies beyond the named plaintiffs. They therefore are 
inappropriate whether issued by one district judge in the Western District of 
Washington, issued by a three-judge district court, affirmed by a panel of a regional 
court of appeals, affirmed by an en banc court of appeals, or affirmed by a 
unanimous Supreme Court. This is not about “a single judge sitting on an island in 
the Pacific” halting enforcement of federal law through lawless individual action, as 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions complained about Hawaii’s injunction of 
enforcement of the travel restriction.202 Universal injunctions would be as improper 
if the Supreme Court were granted original jurisdiction to issue them at the outset 
or if all constitutional challenges to federal laws were adjudicated by three-judge 
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district courts (as they were prior to 1976203), as some have proposed.204 No court, 
regardless of place in the judicial hierarchy or number of members, should issue a 
universal injunction protecting beyond the plaintiffs. 
Rejecting universal injunctions by any court does not mean that a federal 
judgment declaring a law, regulation, or policy constitutionally defective and 
enjoining its enforcement has no effect beyond the named plaintiffs. The effect 
derives from the precedential force of the court’s opinion analyzing the validity of 
the law—the decision of Court I, declaring the attorney regulations invalid as to 
NWIRP, serves as precedent for Court II considering the validity of those 
regulations if the federal government seeks or threatens to enforce against them 
against attorneys other than NWIRP. Precedential force varies by court—a district 
court decision granting the injunction has only persuasive force for the next court, a 
regional court of appeals decision affirming the injunction has binding force on 
district courts within its circuit and persuasive force elsewhere; and a Supreme 
Court affirmance has binding force on all courts in all districts and circuits.205 
Supreme Court affirmance of a non-universal party-specific injunction by a 
district court does not render that injunction universal or extend it to prohibit 
enforcement of the challenged law against non-plaintiffs to that action. The effect 
is similar, of course. Supreme Court affirmance means all future enforcement 
efforts must fail and all pre-enforcement actions to enjoin enforcement must 
succeed, because all courts are bound by the Court’s pronouncement that the 
challenged law is constitutionally defective and not enforceable.206 But the 
affirmance resolves the question as a matter of the law of precedent, the effect of 
one ruling on a second action involving enforcement against people who were not 
party to first case. It is not a function of the law of judgments or as an injunction 
prohibiting enforcement against those non-parties. 
Universal injunctions from lower courts elide these distinctions between 
precedent and judgment and between binding and persuasive precedent. By passing 
on the constitutional question and enjoining government officials from enforcing 
the challenged law against the universe of potential targets, the lower court resolves 
the legal issue for the country, something only the Supreme Court can do.207 And 
the Supreme Court does this not as a matter of a single universal injunction, but as 
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a matter of precedent established in one decision involving one set of parties, to be 
applied in future litigation involving other parties. 
This responds to Frost’s argument that critics of universality prefer the dispute-
resolution model of the judicial role over the competing law-declaration focus.208 
Particularity or non-universality is warranted not because dispute resolution is more 
important than law declaration or that law-declaration is incidental to dispute 
resolution. Rather, both judicial roles are essential, but operate in distinct spheres. 
Dispute resolution operates in the instant case, resolving the dispute between the 
parties, as by enjoining government officials from enforcing the challenged law 
against the plaintiffs. Law declaration operates through precedential effect in 
subsequent litigation involving different enforcement efforts against different 
parties. 
 
B. Expanding the Scope of the Injunction by Expanding the Scope of Litigation 
 
Universal injunctions—injunctions that prohibit enforcement of the challenged 
laws, regulations, and policies beyond the named plaintiffs—are impermissible. But 
that does not mean constitutional must be atomized to single rights-
holder/plaintiffs or that judgments cannot have broader effects.  The solution is 
not to extend the court’s remedial authority beyond the plaintiffs. The solution is to 
expand the who of the litigation, thereby expanding the permissible who of the 
injunction, whether formally or in practice. This allows a judgment and injunctive 
remedy to have broader effects than protecting one individual, while keeping the 
court’s remedial focus on the parties to litigation. 
Each method of expanding the litigation has limitations, drawbacks, and 
difficulties. Each is more complicated, more difficult to establish, and takes longer 
than allowing the court to avoid intermediate steps and issue universal injunctions 
in individual lawsuits. But the difficulty of satisfying the requirements of these 
procedures or the risk of delays does not warrant ignoring them or adopting a new 
procedure (universal injunctions) that obviates established litigation processes. 
 
1. Class Actions 
 
A court can certify an injunctive class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2), where “the party opposing the class” has “acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class,” so “that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”209 
In pre-enforcement actions, government officials oppose the class, their actions in 
enforcing or threatening to enforce the challenged law, regulation, or policy injure 
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the class generally, and an injunction prohibiting enforcement against the class 
protects the class. A class-wide injunction is not a universal injunction. Rather, it 
protects the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is the class, which assumes an identity 
and legal status independent of the representative individual plaintiff.210 The district 
court took this step in the litigation challenging hurdles to abortion access for 
detained undocumented unaccompanied pregnant minors, certifying a class of “all 
pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are or will be in the 
legal custody of the federal government” and granted a class-wide preliminary 
injunction.211  
The Supreme Court enacted the current version of FRCP 23(b)(2) in 1966 to 
achieve two goals related to constitutional litigation. 
The class mechanism ensures that courts can issue broad indivisible relief 
where appropriate. It responded to Massive Resistance to Brown, in which courts 
and school districts admitted named African-American plaintiffs into all-white 
schools, but without altering the basic structure or operation of the school system 
and without benefitting non-party African-American students.212 By certifying a 
class of prospective African-American students wishing to attend integrated 
schools, the court could issue an injunction compelling broader structural changes, 
a remedy benefitting all class members as parties to the case.213 This injunction is 
not universal, because it does not protect beyond the plaintiffs to the case. Rather, 
the rule expands who is a party before the court and therefore who is and may be 
properly protected by a particularized injunction.214 The court may narrow the 
scope and effect of the injunction by narrowing the scope of the class.215 
Rule 23(b)(2) also broadens the preclusive effect of the judgment, eliminating 
the asymmetrical or one-way preclusion plaguing universal injunctions in individual 
actions.216 Prior to 1966, non-parties retained control over how an injunction might 
affect them.217 If the court awarded relief, a non-party could opt-in to the class after 
the fact, reaping the benefits of the injunction. If the court did not award relief, the 
non-party could remain out of the case, unbound by preclusion and free to file a 
new lawsuit.218 Under amended 23(b)(2), the identities of all potential class 
members must be clear and in the case when the court certifies the class, subjecting 
individual members to the full preclusive effect of the decision. Dissenting from 
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universality in Chicago, Judge Manion explained that the universal injunction bound 
the government from denying funds to any sanctuary jurisdiction, but if Chicago 
had lost, any other sanctuary jurisdiction could have filed its own action, unbound 
by the earlier judgment.219 The class mechanism eliminates that “one-way ratchet,” 
by binding all municipalities in the class to the same extent the judgment binds the 
government.220 
Allowing universal injunctions in non-class cases renders Rule 23(b)(2) 
superfluous.221 If a single plaintiff bringing an individual suit can obtain an 
injunction barring enforcement of the challenged law as to everyone in the world, 
no plaintiff would pursue a class action. Not having to certify the class removes an 
issue the plaintiff must litigate. And the lone plaintiff (and her attorneys) can seek 
relief, knowing that others remain free to bring future actions if this one is 
unsuccessful in halting enforcement of the law. 
The incentive to avoid Rule 23 grows because certifying classes can be 
unwieldy and difficult, especially for broad and disparate groups in which members 
may be affected by the same law in different ways.222 Class certification is time-
consuming,223 while TROs and preliminary injunctions are issued in fast-moving, 
even emergent situations. Courts have cut back on aggregate litigation in recent 
years,224 although Carroll criticizes retrenchment as a “myopic” application of fears 
of unwieldy aggregated-damages class actions to the different context of civil rights 
injunctions.225 But the difficulty of litigating class actions does not justify 
circumventing that rule by allowing individual litigation to provide effective class-
wide relief.226 Moreover, there is no disconnect between the urgency of preliminary 
relief from threatened enforcement of a constitutionally defective law and the 
slowness of class certification, because courts can issue class-wide preliminary 
injunctive relief, prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law against the putative 
class, even before formally certifying the class.227 
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While Califano approved a nationwide class (and thus an injunction protecting 
all members of the class),228 Morley argues that such classes should be 
presumptively avoided. He prefers circuit-wide classes, which who is protected 
through class-wide relief, while leaving the government the opportunity to relitigate 
in other cases (whether individual or class actions) in other regional circuits.229 
 
2. Associational Standing 
 
The plaintiff in a constitutional case might be an entity suing on behalf of its 
members who are adversely affected by the challenged law, regulation, or policy.230 
An injunction issued in an associational standing case does not create or justify a 
universal injunction. The injunction runs in favor of the association and its 
members, carrying the same scope as the individuals suing on their own behalf.231 
Association standing creates something like a practical class action of all 
association members. Having an entity sue on behalf of its members expands the 
scope of the injunction, because the entity may have thousands of members spread 
across the country or the world, all of whom enjoy the protections of the injunction 
by virtue of being members of the protected plaintiff-organization. An individual 
avails herself of the injunction’s protections against future enforcement by showing 
membership in the association. 
But the doctrine imposes additional requirements, which makes it less an 
obvious end-run around than purely universal injunctions in individual cases. 
Associational standing requires that members of the association would have had 
individual standing, that the interests protected in the action are “germane” to the 
association’s purposes, and that the claim and injunctive remedy do not require 
individual participation.232  
Associational standing has been present, but not resolved, in these immigration 
cases. One plaintiff in IRAP was the Middle East Studies Association, suing on 
behalf of members whose academic work would be limited by being unable to 
interact with students and scholars from the targeted nations.233 The Fourth Circuit 
did not resolve the organization’s standing, having found standing for a different 
plaintiff (an individual) sufficient to proceed with the action.234 Assuming 
individuals can show membership in the Association, associational standing seems 
present—affected members would have standing and protecting the ability of its 
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members to interact with students and scholars is germane to that organization’s 
purposes. 
 
3. Third-Party Standing 
 
An individual plaintiff, whether a person or organization, may assert third-party 
standing.235 The person or entity claims an injury from defendant’s conduct and 
sues to vindicate the constitutional rights of other persons with whom the plaintiff 
has a business, professional, or other close relationship and where it is not feasible 
for individual right-holders to sue on their own behalf.236 Permissible relationships 
for third-party standing include businesses suing on behalf of potential 
customers,237 medical professionals suing on behalf of patients,238 and lawyers and 
advocates suing on behalf of clients. 239 Hawaii, Washington, and Minnesota 
proceeded on third-party standing on behalf of students, teachers, and scholars 
who would study and work at universities there, but were prevented from doing so 
by the travel order.240 IRAP and HIAS sued on behalf of the refugees who they 
would help resettle but who were barred by the travel order from entering the 
United States.241 
An injunction granted to one plaintiff asserting third-party standing may 
produce an expansive injunction in several respects. The scope of the injunction 
varies with the scope of the plaintiff’s base of clients or customers. It may be 
difficult to determine the plaintiff’s clients or customers; Hawaii argued that  a 
universal injunction was appropriate because it could not identify the individuals 
who might apply to work or study at its universities as to come within the 
injunction’s protections against enforcement of the travel order.242 The injunction 
becomes universal because Every refugee who might be subject to enforcement of 
the challenged travel ban is a potential IRAP client; every student and scholar might 
be a potential student or faculty member at a Hawaiian university. 
This uncertainty affects judicial enforcement of an existing injunction, not its 
scope when entered. The injunction could be written to protect the plaintiff (IRAP 
or Hawaii), then leave to later enforcement efforts whether the person targeted for 
future enforcement of the challenged law is connected to the named plaintiff and 
thus protected by the injunction. In other words, if the government attempts to 
enforce the travel ban against an individual, Hawaii can argue to the court that the 
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individual is a potential student protected by the injunction and that enforcement 
of the travel ban against her is inconsistent with the injunction. But it is 
unnecessary for the injunction protecting Hawaii to also protect Washington, 
Minnesota, or another state and the students and scholars whom those states wish 
to bring to their universities. IRAP can do the same as to a refugee denied entry, 
but it is unnecessary for the injunction protecting IRAP to also protect other 
refugee-resettlement organizations and their potential clients. 
The idea of “bona fide relationship” performs some analytical work here. In 
granting certiorari as to the injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second travel 
order, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction except as to “foreign nationals who 
have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the 
United States.”243 The Ninth Circuit applied the same standard to narrow the 
injunction barring enforcement of the third EO, rejecting a “worldwide” injunction 
as to all nationals of the affected countries.244 The Fourth Circuit did the same as to 
the injunction protecting IRAP and its potential refugee clients.245 
Where a court enjoins enforcement of the challenged law as to an entity 
asserting third-party standing, it can demand a “bona fide relationship” between 
that plaintiff and any rights-holders seeking the protections of the injunction. 
Enforcing an injunction protecting IRAP or Hawaii, the court overseeing the 
injunction must decide whether a foreign national subject to possible enforcement 
of the travel ban has a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship” specifically with 
IRAP or with Hawaii or another plaintiff. If she has such a relationship, the existing 
injunction protects her (as someone on whose behalf the plaintiffs had sued) and 
enforcement of the EO is prohibited. If she does not have such a relationship, the 
injunction does not protect her and the federal government can enforce the travel 
ban to bar person from entering the country, subject to a new or expanded 
injunction protecting her or an organization with which she has that credible claim 
of a bona fide relationship. 
 
4. Incidental Benefits and Spillover Effects 
 
An injunction’s “who” may expand in practice when relief accorded to the 
named plaintiffs in an individual action incidentally inures to the benefits of other 
persons similarly situated. Maureen Carroll describes this as a “system-wide” 
remedy that provides relief as broad as the challenged government policy or 
practice.246 Morley describes this in terms of indivisibility of rights and remedies.247 
Divisible rights belong to the plaintiffs alone and can be remedied by a limited 
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injunction protecting the plaintiffs alone.248 With indivisible rights, the rights of one 
person cannot be separated from the rights of others, thus a remedy benefitting one 
person must benefit other people similarly situated.249 
One example might be school desegregation—an individual African-American 
plaintiff having shown a constitutional violation of being prevented to attend a 
white public school, the court might order integration of the public schools by 
requiring schools to reform their admission policies for all African-American 
students.250 But history shows that such system-wide relief is not inherent to school 
desegregation—courts enjoined school officials to admit individuals without 
ordering system-wide relief, prompting the expansion of injunctive class actions.251 
A better example involves claims challenging prison conditions. Protecting one 
plaintiff prisoner by ordering government officials to remove raw sewage from the 
prison floors benefits other prisoners, since the prison cannot clean sewage as to 
one prisoner and not others; eliminating overcrowding for one prisoner effectively 
eliminates overcrowding for other prisoners held in less-crowded prisons. Another 
example is legislative redistricting—an injunction remedying a constitutionally 
invalid district will order the government to draw a new district, a remedy 
benefitting all voters whose rights were infringed by the previous, constitutionally 
infirm district.252  A final example involves challenges to public religious displays—
the injunction protects one plaintiff from the offense of having to come across a 
display of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse by ordering government to 
remove the display, benefitting non-parties who also might be offended, since 
government cannot remove the display for one person and not others. 
Laycock offers a related situation in which government officials cannot 
distinguish plaintiffs from non-plaintiffs. The court enjoined overly aggressive 
practices in enforcing a state motorcycle helmet law.253 An individual patrol officer 
could not know whether the motorcyclist against whom he was enforcing the law 
had been a plaintiff, was protected by the injunction, and placed the officer in 
danger of violating the court order; the court therefore properly enjoined the 
forbidden practices as to all motorcyclists in the state.254 But this seems a rare 
situation, one that could be addressed by establishing a 23(b)(2) class of 
motorcyclists in the state and obtaining a class-wide injunction. 
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One point of confusion is between these incidental spillover benefits to non-
parties and considerations of public interest that are required in the injunction 
analysis. Frost argues that if the court must account for concerns of non-party 
members of the public in deciding whether to grant an injunction, the court also 
can protect non-party members of the public in the injunction.255 In deciding 
whether to issue an injunction, the court considers the public interest and balances 
the equities.256 This analysis is concerned with potential conflicts between the 
injunction protecting the named party and the broader public, with the goal of 
balancing the interests of the individual plaintiff and against the possible competing 
interests of the public at large. But accounting for countervailing public interests in 
deciding whether to issue the injunction is different from protecting the public at 
large by mandating spillover in the injunction itself.  
Frost offers an example of a challenge to a voter-ID law, in which a non-party 
may believe that the absence of a voter-ID requirement abridges her right to vote, 
but would lack Article III standing to bring such a claim.257 But the injunction 
analysis accounts for the competing concerns Frost raises. In balancing the equities 
and determining whether an injunction prohibiting enforcement of a voter-ID law 
is in the public interest, the district court accounts for the negative externalities 
upon voters who would be protected by the ID law (the people the government 
sought to protect by enacting the law in the first instance). That is different from 
extending the benefits of the injunction to everyone similarly situated (rather than 
adverse to) the plaintiff. 
Courts also should not assume that only a broad injunction is sufficient. Court 
may order general remedies—ordering defendant officials to “remedy 
constitutionally deficient prison conditions” or “cease enforcing the challenged 
law”—and leave to officials the discretion of how to achieve that obligation. If the 
government believes a narrower change sufficient to satisfy the injunction, it can 
pursue that narrower option. The only requirement is that any remedy protect the 
named plaintiffs. And no one can complain that the injunction does not protect 
others. 
Granting incidental or spillover benefits to non-parties does not make the 
injunction universal or expand the “who” the injunction protects. Unlike the named 
plaintiff, the non-party cannot enforce the injunction if the government acts 
inconsistent with the court’s order and the government cannot be held in contempt 
for its actions as to non-parties. If a non-party believes government officials have 
failed to make sufficient progress in redressing the constitutional violations, she 
cannot move the court to act and push the defendants. Only the plaintiff can 
enforce the injunction, and if the party is satisfied with the pace of the defendant’s 
compliance, a non-party can do nothing about that. Others may benefit from the 
litigation decisions the plaintiff makes, but the decisions are the plaintiff’s to make. 
To gain direct protection and the right to ask the court to enforce, non-parties must 
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obtain their own injunctions (using the first decision for some precedential value) 
prohibiting enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, or policies as to them. 
 
5. Voluntary Compliance as to Non-Parties 
 
Government officials, enjoined from enforcing the challenged law as to the 
named plaintiffs, may go further than the injunction and cease enforcing the law 
against other persons.258 They may do so for many reasons—convenience, 
agreement with the decision, or belief that the precedential force of the decision 
ensures that later courts will agree that the law is constitutionally invalid and enjoin 
or reject future enforcement against a different group of rights-holders.259 State and 
local officials may do so out of cost concerns—a defeat in future constitutional 
litigation arising from actual or threatened enforcement against others may result in 
awards of attorney’s fees.260 This represents the other sphere for law declaration261--
the declaration of law in the course of issuing the injunction may prompt 
government officials to cease all enforcement efforts against all persons, even if the 
injunction does not compel them to do so. 
Voluntary compliance played a substantial role in marriage-equality litigation, 
before and after the Supreme Court decided the constitutional question. Having 
been enjoined from enforcing same-sex-marriage bans and having been compelled 
to issue marriage licenses to plaintiff couples, officials in many states went further, 
voluntarily issuing marriage licenses to all same-sex couples.262 That has not 
happened with respect to immigration and immigration-adjacent matters, reflecting 
the Trump Administration’s understandable desire to fight these to the end, as well 
as the stages in which much these cases stand. Government officials are not 
required to comply beyond the named plaintiffs, and executive officials do not 
violate the Constitution or their oaths by refusing to voluntarily comply or by 
waiting for new injunctions.263 
What constitute “the end” of this process is unclear. The popular perception is 
that the end is a Supreme Court determination of the constitutional validity of the 
law; once the Court speaks to the validity of the travel ban or the sanctuary-city 
regulations, the government will cease all enforcement against all persons. But, as 
noted above, the judgment of the Supreme Court in a case arising from an 
individual injunction (as opposed to a class injunction or an injunction protecting a 
broad group of an association’s members or clients) does not compel this.264 
Assuming some form of departmentalism in which judicial understandings of the 
Constitution do not preempt the popular branches from adopting their own 
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understandings of the Constitution,265 the executive could rely on his constitutional 
conclusions that the law remains valid and enforceable against others, at least until a 
new or expanded injunction prohibits enforcement against that next group of 
rights-holders. In following a Supreme Court decision and declining to enforce the 
challenged law as to non-plaintiffs, the executive engages in a form of voluntary 
compliance. 
Universal injunctions reflect lower-court impatience with the process of 
precedent and voluntarily compliance, issued on the belief that non-parties should 
be as protected as parties from enforcement of the challenged law.266 But there is 
no obvious reason for that, at least under the traditional conception of 
constitutional defects being about enforcement against a target rather than the 
enactment or existence of the law itself. Courts granting universal injunctions 
assume the government will not question the scope of the injunction because 
officials voluntarily comply as to all non-parties similarly situated.267 Plaintiffs 
remain protected against enforcement by the judgment, regardless of what else 
government officials do as to other rights-holders. Any value or need to protect 
non-parties against enforcement of constitutionally suspect laws268 derives from 
government’s voluntary decisions not to enforce. Universal injunctions, overbroad 
as to “who,” deprive executive officials of that choice and relieve rights-holders of 
the obligation to take the additional step of commencing new litigation.  
 
C. Trying, and Failing, to Defend Universal Injunctions 
 
Despite the arguments described above, universal injunctions are becoming 
common and routine.269 During argument in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Gorsuch 
questioned Hawaii’s counsel about “this troubling ris of this nationwide injunction, 
cosmic injunction . . . not limited to relief for the parties at issue or even a class 
action.” And counsel admitted to sharing Gorsuch’s impulse about the overbroad 
remedy.270 
 
 
Courts in these immigration and immigration-adjacent actions have been 
unhesitant and unrepentant in issuing such injunctions. And they have done so with 
little or no explanation or justification, beyond listing singular reasons. Only in 
Chicago v. Sessions, where the district court denied to stay a universal injunction271 
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and the court of appeals affirmed the universal injunction,272 did the courts offer 
detailed support for the practice. No justification withstands close scrutiny. All 
either fail to support the universal injunction or prove too much, making 
universality the default in all challenges to the validity of all federal laws, 
regulations, and policies, despite insistence to the contrary. 
This part considers, and rejects, the reasons offered by courts in these classes 
of immigration and by commentators supporting the practice. 
 
1. Supreme Court Approval 
 
The Supreme Court approved the practice of universal injunctions in concept, 
at least implicitly. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit by an evenly divided Court 
in Texas v. United States, including the universal scope of the injunction.273 In a per 
curiam opinion granting certiorari and staying the universal preliminary injunctions 
against the second travel ban, the Court allowed the injunction to continue to 
protect the plaintiffs “and those similarly situated.”274 Both appear to accept 
universality (as narrowed in some respects) and protection for non-parties. The 
district court in Chicago cited the Fourth Circuit in IRAP II (on the second travel 
ban) in supporting the universal injunction against the sanctuary-city funding 
regulations.275 
There are reasons to doubt the force of these decisions. At a minimum, they do 
not resolve the issue. 
An affirmance by an evenly divided Court carries limited precedential force, 
depriving Texas of meaningful authority for the practice.276 Trump v. IRAP was a per 
curiam opinion resolving a petition for certiorari and motion for stay pending 
appeal, without full merits briefing as to the scope of the injunction and without 
explanation or analysis of whether an injunction could or should protect beyond 
the plaintiffs. The Court never reached the merits of the constitutional challenge, 
dismissing the appeal and vacating the injunction as moot when the ban lapsed by 
its own terms in September 2017, meaning the Court never had an opportunity to 
consider the scope of the injunction on its merits.277 If the court did approve of 
universal injunctions in these cases, it did so without considering or explaining why. 
And the Court was not unanimous on the point. Justice Thomas dissented in 
part for himself and Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Citing Califano’s complete-relief 
principle and emphasizing that relief should run “to the plaintiffs,” Thomas argued 
that “a court's role is ‘to provide relief’ only ‘to claimants ... who have suffered, or 
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will imminently suffer, actual harm.’”278 Courts act to protect parties from future 
injuries from enforcement of challenged laws and regulations, not to issue orders 
benefitting the uninverse of affected non-parties. 
 
2. Equal Protection and the Rule of Law 
 
Courts insist that particularized, plaintiff-only non-universal injunctions raise 
equal protection and rule-of-law problems, by prohibiting enforcement of federal 
law against some persons or entities (parties to the suit and the injunction) while 
permitting enforcement of the same law against other people or entities (non-
parties not protected by the injunction). The district court in Chicago explained that 
“[a]ll similarly-situated persons are entitled to similar outcomes under the law, and 
as a corollary, an injunction that results in unequal treatment of litigants appears 
arbitrary.”279 Leaving the federal government free to administer the funding 
regulations, which were declared invalid as to Chicago, against other states and 
cities “flies in the face of the rule of law and the role of the courts to ensure the 
rule of law is enforced.”280 The Fourth Circuit framed this in terms of the 
“message” of the law—allowing continued enforcement of the travel ban against 
similarly situated non-plaintiffs sends the “message” that non-plaintiffs “are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community.”281 
The short answer to the equal protection argument is that parties and non-
parties are not similarly situated and so are not entitled to similar outcomes. 
“Because the plaintiff is the one who took the initiative and sued, it is the plaintiff 
who is protected. Others can receive the same protection if they take the same 
action by bringing their own suits (invoking the authority of the earlier 
decision).”282 Stated differently, “X (whether rich or poor) had to sue the 
government to win, and now Y (whether rich or poor) also has to sue the 
government to win.”283 Were Y to sue the government and obtain her own 
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law against her, Y and X 
become similarly situated—and any differential treatment disappears, because both 
are protected  by an injunction against future enforcement of the challenged law. 
Concretely, if Chicago obtains an injunction protecting its funding but New York 
City does not, there is no equal protection problem in stripping New York City of 
funds but not Chicago, because the cities are not similarly situated. When New 
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York City obtains its own injunction protecting its funding, the cities become 
similarly situated and treated the same—neither can be stripped of its funding. 
The longer answer is that the equal-protection argument misapprehends 
judicial review, the structure of the federal courts, and the nature of constitutional 
judicial decisionmaking. 
Constitutional review has been delegated, at least in part,284 to federal courts, 
which resolve constitutional questions in the course of resolving concrete legal 
disputes between discrete parties.285 Federal-court decisionmaking is distributed 
among three levels of a hierarchical structure. The two lower tiers are 
geographically dispersed and its precedential effect is geographically limited—a 
court of appeals creates binding precedent for itself and all district courts within its 
circuit, while a district court creates persuasive authority but has no binding effect, 
even within its district.286 Only the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchy has 
nationwide precedential reach, but its original jurisdiction is limited.287 
Temporary disuniformity of federal law is inherent in multiple federal courts 
performing constitutional review in discrete factual situations.288 It constitutes a 
feature rather than a bug in a system that relies on “percolation” of issues in lower 
courts. Multiple district and circuit judges have the opportunity to express their 
views. And the process achieves a balanced result, either through lower-court 
consensus that obviates Supreme Court resolution or lower-court disagreement that 
gives the Supreme Court a fuller legal and factual record with which to work when 
it ultimately resolves the legal question.289 Either approach yields ultimate 
uniformity of federal law, albeit at the cost of temporary disuniformity as multiple 
cases in multiple courts wend through the judicial process in mu.290 
Universal injunctions short-circuit that percolation process by allowing one 
district court (with affirmance by one circuit panel) to halt all enforcement against 
all persons, as a matter of a single judgment. This allows one lower court to make 
                                                 
284 Cf. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 252–53; Lawson and 
Moore, supra note ___, 1269–70; Walsh, supra note 205, at 1715; Wasserman, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 7–8. 
285 Bray, supra note 11, at 461–62; Frost, supra note ___, at m 44-46; supra notes ___ and accompanying 
text. 
286 Bray, supra note ___, at 465; Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 205, at 1339–40; 
Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 205, at 923 n.31. 
287 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
138 (1803). The state plaintiffs in Hawaii v. Trump, Washington v. Trump, and Texas v. United States could 
have framed the cases to create a controversy between the United States and a state for original 
jurisdiction under § 1251(b)(2). But (b)(2) jurisdiction is concurrent; district courts had jurisdiction 
over the actions because the states’ claims arose under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
Supreme Court practice has been to decline original jurisdiction over such cases, pushing the state 
plaintiffs to district court and the ordinary review process. 
288 Bray, supra note 11, at 461; Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1605–06 
(2008). 
289 Bray, supra note 11, at 46. 
290 Id. 
 
law for the nation.291 This compels the Supreme Court to resolve the matter on 
review of a single case rather than a broader record of multiple lower-court 
analyses. More problematically, some faster-moving immigration cases been 
resolved at the stage of a preliminary-injunction (or a temporary restraining order 
treated as a preliminary injunction).292 Because orders granting preliminary 
injunctions are immediately and automatically appealable,293 cases move through 
the system, and to the Supreme Court, in a preliminary posture and without a full 
record.294 When an evenly divided eight-Justice Court could not agree in Texas, the 
Fifth Circuit decision became governing law for all persons in all places, never 
having gotten beyond the preliminary-injunction stage. 
Ultimate uniformity of federal law remains distinct from the universal “who” 
of a single injunction. A uniform determination that a law, regulation, or policy is 
constitutionally invalid produces multiple injunctions barring enforcement as to the 
named plaintiffs, but not non-parties. The final decision serves as binding 
precedent, establishing that any future enforcement effort against unprotected non-
parties will fail, given binding precedent establishing the invalidity of the law to be 
enforced.295 The result is uniformity in litigation outcomes—the challenged law 
cannot be enforced—through multiple court orders. 
Universal injunctions also become subject to demagogic criticism from elected 
officials displeased with a ruling, as when Attorney General Jeff Sessions decried 
that one “judge sitting on an island in the Pacific can issue an order that stops the 
president of the United States” from enforcing federal immigration law.296 Sessions 
would have lobbed the same criticism at a particularized injunction limited to 
Hawaii and to the plaintiffs in the case. And he would have lobbed the same 
criticism at a similar decision from a nine-justice Supreme Court affirming the 
injunction and the constitutional defects in the law. But giving the injunction 
broader effect than it should have lends force to criticisms of overreaching federal 
judges. 
Criticizing temporary disuniformity on rule-of-law grounds also fails to give 
content to the concept of rule of law. It cannot begin and end with uniformity, but 
must account for additional ideas—including equitable, constitutional, and practical 
limitations on the scope of courts’ remedial authority, limitations on the 
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precedential effect of decisions from lower courts, courts’ positions in the judicial 
hierarchy,297 and other problems arising from universal injunctions. The rule of law 
also includes the power of the executive to engage in and act on its constitutional 
interpretation, including enforcing laws it believes constitutional when not 
otherwise prohibited from doing so by a properly scoped, non-universal 
injunction.298 An injunction that undercuts presidential power undercuts a 
component of the rule of law. 
 
3. Uniform Immigration Law 
 
The Constitution empowers Congress to “establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”299 The Fifth Circuit justified the universal injunction in Texas 
because an injunction limited to the 26 plaintiff states would result in “[p]artial 
implementation” of DAPA, contrary to the Framers’ intent in Article I and 
Congress’ intent in enacting current immigration statutes.300 The Fourth Circuit 
adopted that idea in affirming universal injunctions against the second and third 
travel bans,301 as did district courts enjoining DACA rescission.302 
The uniformity argument fails in several respects. The Fifth Circuit relied on 
language from Arizona v. United States303 demanding uniformity and unification of 
the legislative regime governing immigration. But Arizona involved federal 
preemption of a state’s laws implicating the immigration system (the challenged 
state law made certain immigration violations state crimes and authorized local law 
enforcement to stop and search persons suspected of being unlawfully present304); 
the preemption power arose from the need to ensure uniformity and to prevent 
state law from creating federal disuniformity.305 Uniformity-through-preemption 
was inapplicable to the situation in Texas, in which federal regulation provided the 
sole statutory rule (DAPA), but courts were in the midst of ruling on individual 
challenges to the validity of enforcing that rule as to plaintiffs. 
The Fifth Circuit’s take on the uniformity requirement would render ordinary 
litigation impossible for constitutional challenges to immigration laws, because even 
temporary disuniformity created by lower-court splits and particularized, non-
universal injunctions would become constitutionally unacceptable. Only the 
Supreme Court could decide constitutional challenges to immigration laws, but it 
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would have to do so with no opportunity for percolation in the lower courts and 
limited original jurisdiction. And, in any event, a single Supreme Court decision 
does not mean a universal injunction, only binding precedent.306 
A second part of the immigration-law-is-unique argument rests on geographic 
dispersal of people affected by immigration laws. IRAP was brought by six 
individuals scattered throughout the United States, two immigrant-resettlement 
organizations on behalf of clients dispersed in the targeted countries, and an 
academic organization on behalf of its members dispersed around the world.307 
Hawaii sued on behalf of many unknown and dispersed students and scholars the 
state hoped to bring to its universities.308 This geographic dispersal necessitated the 
broad injunction. This continues conflating who and where—the injunctions 
should protect the plaintiffs (including organizations’ members and clients) 
wherever they are in the world, but should not protect anyone other than those 
plaintiffs and their members and clients. 
The Fifth Circuit in Texas also argued that a “geographically-limited injunction 
would be ineffective because DAPA beneficiaries would be free to move among 
states.”309 Texas established standing based on its program of issuing state-
subsidized drivers’ licenses to all persons lawfully within the United States, which 
would include DAPA beneficiaries able to show lawful presence or employment 
authorization; Texas would be required to spend millions of dollars subsidizing 
licenses for people in the United States under an unconstitutional executive 
policy.310 Texas therefore could not obtain complete relief from an injunction 
barring enforcement of DAPA only in Texas, as by prohibiting the grant of lawful 
status to otherwise-unlawfully present persons in Texas. If the United States could 
continue to defer removal and accord lawful presence or work authorization to an 
individual in a non-plaintiff state (such as Illinois or New York), that individual 
could move to Texas and apply for a subsidized license. Only by eliminating all 
enforcement of DAPA in all states could a court protect Texas against that 
monetary injury. 
But a universal injunction was not the only way for Texas to avoid that injury. 
The narrowest effective injunction would have excused Texas from issuing drivers’ 
licenses to any DAPA recipients, whether in Texas or traveling to Texas from 
elsewhere; that injunction would have remedied the precise injury that Texas used 
to get to federal court.311 A broader, although still non-universal, effective 
injunction would have prohibited the federal government from deferring removal 
or according benefits to individuals present in Texas and would have ordered that 
Texas need not grant nor subsidize drivers’ licenses or other benefits for persons 
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claiming the right to the benefit under DAPA, whether present in Texas at the time 
of the injunction or later moving there. There was no need for the court to enjoin 
the federal government from exercising DAPA discretion, and according DAPA 
benefits, outside the twenty-six objecting states. 
Counsel for Hawaii in the travel-ban litigation urged the Supreme Court not to 
resolve scope-of-the-injunction in that case because of its immigration context and 
congressional power over immigration.312 
 
 
4. Duplicative and Inconsistent Litigation 
 
Faced with the prospect of being unable to issue universal injunctions and only 
being able to protect named plaintiffs, courts have appeared at a loss. The district 
courts in the sanctuary-cities cases emphasized that other jurisdictions would face 
the same legal risk of loss of funding and that the federal government claimed the 
same enforcement authority as to all states, counties, and municipalities receiving 
federal funds.313 This was a problem that only a universal injunction could resolve. 
Two solutions are obvious. Plaintiffs can file their constitutional cases as Rule 
23(b)(2) injunctive class actions and obtain injunctions protecting the class of 
persons or entities everywhere in the United States, all of whom are parties.314 Or 
every individual or organization (or groups of organizations) must file separate 
lawsuits and obtain separate injunctions barring enforcement of the challenged laws 
as to them or their members and clients. The earlier injunction and opinion 
provides some precedential value in the latter actions, depending on how far the 
first case went in the judicial hierarchy. And the multiple lawsuits allow the 
percolation on which good judicial decisionmaking depends.  
Federal courts have come to regard the latter solution as inefficient and 
insufficient, the race to issue universal injunctions reflecting impatience with the 
ordinary judicial processes of particularized judgments, precedent, and percolation 
of legal issues.315 The district court in Chicago insisted that because 37 counties and 
cities filed an amicus brief, judicial economy counseled against compelling each to 
file a separate lawsuit to have a court resolve the same legal issues resolved in that 
case.316 The alternative risked a flood of duplicative litigation, as every city or 
country subject to the funding restrictions must obtain its own injunction.317 The 
Chicago court also feared the risk of inconsistent judgments, with one court 
declaring the law invalid and enjoining enforcement as to some cities and another 
court declaring the law valid and allowing enforcement as to other persons. The 
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Seventh Circuit agreed that the “likelihood of widespread, duplicative litigation” 
and concerns for “judicial economy counseled against requiring” many jurisdiction 
to file “individual suits to decide anew the narrow legal question in the case.”318 
Under the traditional conception of constitutional litigation and the way federal 
constitutional adjudication should function, subsequent litigation involving 
different plaintiffs does not constitute duplicative litigation.  Litigation is about 
enforcement of the challenged law or regulation against particular plaintiffs. The 
similarity of legal issues between different cases does not alter that nature of 
constitutional litigation, so it does not render separate litigation redundant or 
duplicative. Each act of enforcement of a constitutionally defective law against a 
different individual is a distinct constitutional violation. Each action to enjoin 
enforcement against a different individual is a distinct constitutional claim involving 
the rights of that plaintiff. And each individual will defend her constitutional rights 
in different ways with different arguments, leading to different analyses and, 
perhaps, outcomes.319 Bray captures the point, while acknowledging its 
overstatement, as “there are no duplicative cases. Even if they both involve the 
same legal question, your case is your case and my case is my case.”320 
Any inefficiency is inherent in that limited scope of a court’s equitable powers 
and in the hierarchically and geographically distributed decisionmaking of the 
federal system. Efficiency justifies joinder or consolidation of these multiple claims 
into a single proceeding for efficiency purposes,321 but it does not turn each 
plaintiff’s claim into a single claim. These concerns cannot expand the power of a 
court in a single case or alter the structure and function of the federal judiciary. And 
the system of percolation understands inconsistency as a benefit, part of what lower 
courts are supposed to do in moving toward a final, uniform constitutional 
determination. 
Bray argues that allowing universal injunctions creates a more significant 
problem in the other direction—conflicting injunctions.322 An injunction issued by 
one district court does not bind another district or circuit; an injunction affirmed by 
one circuit does not bind another circuit. That the issuing court labeled or 
purported to make its injunction universal does not alter this. But it does allow 
multiple courts to expand their remedial reaches, creating a possible collision. 
Imagine a case in which Court I enjoins a federal official to do x, while another 
court enjoins the same official to refrain from doing x. As neither injunction takes 
precedence (short of a Supreme Court decision affirming one injunction and 
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reversing the other), that federal official risks violating an injunction and being held 
in contempt no matter what she did.323 
Following the universal injunction barring enforcement of DAPA, individuals 
filed suit in two other federal districts seeking a declaration that the United States 
was not bound by the injunction outside of Texas or as to people outside of Texas 
and an injunction permitting the United States to enforce DAPA (and not deport 
people) outside of Texas. Courts avoid this “doomsday scenario” through restraint 
and good luck, both of which can run out.324 They can avoid it formally by rejecting 
universal injunctions and limiting all injunctions to protecting the named plaintiffs. 
Court I’s injunction prohibits enforcement as to the plaintiffs before it, but says 
nothing about the parties before Court II, whose fate remains to that court’s 
constitutional determination. Unfortunately, district courts display increasing 
reluctance to exercise this remedial restraint. 
At a minimum, federal officials remain unclear about what they are empowered 
to do in enforcing federal law. Imagine Court I declares the law constitutionally 
invalid and issues a universal injunction but Court II declares the law 
constitutionally valid and allows the government to enforce it against. Enforcing 
the law, as permitted by Court II, would place him in contempt of Court I. But 
abiding by the judgment in Court I places that court and its judgment above a 
contrary judgment from a co-equal court. 
 
5. Facial Unconstitutionality 
 
Several courts have imposed universal injunctions due to the purported facial 
unconstitutionality of the challenged laws, having them unconstitutional in all 
possible applications, as opposed to declaring them unconstitutional only as applied 
to the plaintiffs.325 A limited, particularized, non-universal injunction is inconsistent 
with the declaration of facial unconstitutionality. Having determined that the 
challenged law is unconstitutional beyond the plaintiffs, a court cannot allow 
continued enforcement against other rights-holders.  
This misapprehends the meaning and effect of facial unconstitutionality. The 
declaration of facial unconstitutionality goes to the scope of the court’s 
constitutional analysis and reasoning, therefore to its precedential effect. If Court I 
declares the law facially unconstitutional, Court II might use that as precedent to 
declare the law unconstitutional as to future plaintiffs. A Supreme Court declaration 
of facial unconstitutionality does the work for Court II—no further analysis is 
necessary if binding precedent establishes that the law cannot be constitutionally 
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applied in the new context or to the new parties.326 But Court I and Court II make 
those constitutional determinations in the course of enjoining enforcement of the 
law as to some plaintiffs. A declaration of facial unconstitutionality does not expand 
the court’s remedial authority or empower it to enjoin the defendant from 
enforcing against persons outside the case. The court’s order remains limited to the 
plaintiffs, although the precedential effect of its pronouncement of facial invalidity 
may be broader.327 
 
6. Narrow Legal Issues 
In affirming a universal injunction barring DOJ from withholding funds from 
sanctuary cities, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the challenge involved “purely 
a narrow issue of law; it is not fact-dependent and will not vary from one locality to 
another.”328 Such a narrow question of law lends itself to broader injunctive relief 
and will not benefit from percolation through additional courts.329 Some legal 
issues—such as what constitutes excessive force—benefit from consideration in 
multiple courts in different factual contexts that inform the legal principle. With 
legal issues such as the plain meaning of a statute, “the duplication of litigation will 
have little, if any, beneficial effect.”330 
The dissent in Chicago rejected this approach, because it renders a nationwide 
injunction appropriate in every statutory interpretation case. The similarity of legal 
issues does not ensure similarity in litigation or resolution. Different parties engage 
different arguments on the same legal issues, producing divergent analyses and 
results, while allowing the strongest arguments to come to the fore, all to the 
benefit of courts able to identify and draw on the best-reasoned opinions.331 Each 
constitutional cases involves different parties, arguments, and analyses, even on 
purely legal, fact-free, issues. Universal injunctions should not preempt the process 
of courts working through those legal issues. 
 
7. Proving Too Much 
 
The district court in Chicago insisted that universal injunctions should not be the 
default approach, but remain an “extraordinary remedy that should be limited by 
the nature of the constitutional violation and subject to prudent use by the 
courts.”332 In affirming, the Seventh Circuit agreed that universal injunctions were a 
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“powerful remedy” to be “employed with discretion” in “rare cases.”333 Amanda 
Frost, the strongest scholarly advocate for universal injunctions, argues that the 
“default should be against issuing a nationwide injunction.  A single district court 
judge should not lightly assert control over federal policy for the nation, and should 
allow her fellow judges to reach their own decisions in cases involving different 
plaintiffs.”334 
The increasing use of universal injunctions, including as to the immigration 
laws discussed, suggests that universality is becoming the default in challenges to 
the constitutional validity of federal law, at least federal immigration and 
immigration-adjacent law. Leaving the injunction’s “who” to the prudence of 
district courts is not working as a limiting principle. Or prudence can only hold for 
so long and we have reached that point. 
The permissible-but-rare defense also proves too much. Chicago upheld the 
universal injunction against the sanctuary-city regulations in light of concerns for 
uniformity, unfairness of disparate application, and the rule of law,335 each 
constituting an “extraordinary” element warranting a universal injunction. But each 
of those elements is present in every constitutional challenge to every federal law. 
By its terms, therefore, the argument requires—or at least encourages—a district 
court to issue a universal injunction to prohibit  enforcement  of any federal law 
regulating any federal conduct. 
The authority of federal officials to enforce any federal law never varies by 
jurisdiction—the law and the power to enforce the law is the same nationwide. 
Judicial economy always favors one lawsuit over multiple lawsuits. There would be 
a flood of similar lawsuits by everyone affected by every federal law. Federal 
uniformity and the unfairness of disparate application of federal law are present 
with respect to every federal law. If the rule of law is undermined by enforcement 
of a “likely invalid” law to persons other than the named plaintiff protected by the 
injunction, it is undermined by enforcement of every federal law that one court has 
declared constitutionally invalid. Despite the court’s rhetorical attempt to limit 
universal injunctions to extraordinary cases, every case is extraordinary, as the court 
defined it. 
Frost argues that universal injunctions are uniquely necessary in the face of 
executive action, such as the executive orders and regulations challenged in these 
immigration cases. She argues that the executive can announce new federal policy at 
the last minute, making it difficult for plaintiffs to certify a class before the policy 
takes effect, then can fight class certification; only a universal injunction prevents 
the executive from controlling litigation to prevent entry of injunctions that protect 
more than a few individuals at a time.336 But it is not clear why this concern is 
greater for federal executive action than for federal legislation; while legislation 
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takes longer to enact than an executive order, the possibilities for manipulative 
litigation are the same. Moreover, courts can issue preliminary relief to benefit a 
putative class, even if it has not yet formally certified the class.337 So the 
government does not hold exclusive power to avoid broader injunctions protecting 
a broader group of plaintiffs. 
 
IV. The Way Forward 
 
Universal injunctions are generally inappropriate in individual constitutional 
litigation and should not be issued in the mine run of cases. Universal injunctions 
are specifically inappropriate in the constitutional litigation challenging the 
immigration and immigration-adjacent policies discussed here. Even allowing for 
broader injunctions in some circumstances, these cases do not come within those 
circumstances—the rights and remedies are divisible, a narrower injunction affords 
plaintiffs complete relief, a narrower injunction is commensurate with the 
constitutional violation found in the threatened enforcement of the constitutionally 
defective laws as to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ use class actions, associational standing, 
and third-party standing would have allowed for sufficiently broad and protective 
injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, and 
policies, even if those injunctions were not universal and were particularized to the 
plaintiffs. 
This Part briefly describes the appropriate scope of the injunctions that should 
have issued in these six categories of litigation. 
 
A. Attorney Regulations 
 
The injunction in NWIRP should have prohibited EOIP from enforcing the 
attorney regulations as to NWIRP, by precluding EOIP from sanctioning NWIRP 
or NWIRP attorneys for continuing to advise pro se litigants without filing a formal 
appearance. The injunction should be nationwide in protecting NWIRP from 
enforcement of the regulations in any immigration proceedings anywhere in the 
country. The injunction need not and should not protect other attorneys or legal-
representation organizations. NWIRP’s rights are unaffected by any DOJ promised 
attempts to enforce the regulations against other attorneys and the particularized 
injunction is commensurate with the violation of NWIRP’s First Amendment rights 
from threatened enforcement. Other attorneys or organizations can file their own 
lawsuits if threatened with enforcement; the district court’s First Amendment 
decision in NWIRP can provide persuasive authority on the constitutional validity 
of the regulations for use in future litigation. 
 
B. Abortion Access for Detained Undocumented Unaccompanied Minors 
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Wanting a broader injunction to protect all pregnant undocumented 
unaccompanied minors in HHS detention, the plaintiffs took the appropriate steps 
by seeking to certify a class action, expanding who qualifies as a plaintiff in the case. 
The court subsequently certified a 23(b)(2) class, defined as “all pregnant, 
unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are or will be in the legal 
custody of the federal government.” In other words, the court expanded the “who” 
of the injunction in the appropriate manner—by using class-action procedure to 
expand the “who” of the litigation. 
 
C. Funding of Sanctuary Cities 
 
The district courts in Chicago and Santa Clara should have issued injunctions 
prohibiting DOJ from denying funding to Chicago and to Santa Clara and San 
Francisco, respectively. The injunctions cannot and should not prohibit DOJ from 
denying funding to any other city; neither Chicago’s nor Santa Clara’s rights are 
affected by DOJ attempts to enforce the funding regulations to other jurisdictions, 
nor is their relief rendered less than complete if DOJ attempts to strip funds from 
other municipalities. Other jurisdictions can file their own suits if threatened with 
enforcement, using the prior decisions as persuasive authority on the constitutional 
validity of the regulations. 
 
D. DAPA and DACA Rescission 
 
The injunction in Texas would have been sufficient had it relieved Texas of the 
obligation to subsidize drivers’ licenses for any DAPA recipients. Or the injunction 
could have prohibited enforcement of DAPA in Texas and the twenty-five co-
plaintiff states; the order could have prohibited the federal government from 
deferring removal to the class of immigrants in those states and from conferring 
federal and state benefits to immigrants in those states. The problem of people 
moving from other (non-injunction) states into Texas can be addressed by not 
requiring Texas or the other plaintiff states to provide state benefits, such as 
subsidized drivers’ licenses, to DAPA recipients. The federal government could 
continue to provide DAPA benefits to persons in non-objecting states. 
The order enjoining DACA rescission similarly should have been limited to the 
plaintiff DACA recipients and the other entities and organizations bringing the suit 
on behalf of particular recipients. The government could have proceeded with 
rescission in other states, at least with respect to recipients who lacked bona fide 
relationships with some of the plaintiffs. 
 
 E. Travel Bans 
 
These represent the most difficult cases, although particularized, non-universal 
injunctions were possible. 
It is logically possible to enjion enforcement of the ban to some persons and 
not others—to allow some refugees or visitors from the targeted nations into the 
country and not others. And allowing enforcement of the ban to some persons, 
while prohibiting enforcement as to the named plaintiffs, does not deny the named 
plaintiffs complete relief. 
The difficulty or uncertainty of identifying students and scholars who might 
come to Hawaii or of identifying IRAP clients in the target nations can be resolved  
at the enforcement stage. Faced with a future government attempt to prohibit an 
individual from traveling to the United States, Hawaii or IRAP must show that the 
targeted individual has a “bona fide” relationship with it that is “’formal, 
documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of 
evading the travel restrictions.”338 That relationship means attempted enforcement 
against the person with a bona fide relationship is barred by the injunction and can 
be halted by a court order enforcing the injunction. If the enforcement target lacks 
that bona fide relationship, she must seek a new injunction or an extension of the 
existing injunction. Either way, there is no need to expand the injunction at the 
point of issuance. 
The Supreme Court granted cert in Hawaii, including on the scope-of-
injunction question, so the issue could be resolved, at least in this unique context, 
sooner rather than later. 
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